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Abstract 
Eurosceptic political parties are predicted to over perform in second-order elections such as the 
European Parliamentary (EP) elections. Yet, not all eurosceptic parties have been successful in 
taking electoral advantage of their second-order electoral benefits. I argue that EP voters 
respond to EP legislative behavior and reward eurosceptic parties that actively oppose the EU 
by posing questions and attending plenary sessions, while EP voters punish eurosceptic parties 
that do not actively participate in the EP. Furthermore, the media provide the vital link between 
eurosceptic party EP legislative engagement and EP voters by providing increased levels of 
media exposure for engaged eurosceptic parties. There is an electoral benefit to public 
grandstanding, and eurosceptics who behave strategically are able to tap into EP voter malaise 
in ways that extend beyond mere anti-EU ideology. 
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Chapter I 
The Engaged Eurosceptic 
 
At the time of finishing this dissertation, spring 2017, it hardly requires an explanation for why it 
is important to conduct social scientific research on extremist political parties. The rise of 
populism is now global. The rhetoric utilized by extreme right populists like Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
Nick Griffin, or Pim Fortuyn during Europe’s previous generation of hard eurosceptics has given 
way to a more mainstream message of right-wing populism epitomized by Marine Le Pen, Nigel 
Farage, and Geert Wilders. Globally, right-wing populism and anti-globalization movements are 
now being seen throughout the world in democracies ranging from the US with Donald Trump’s 
presidential victory, the UK with the Leave vote besting the Remain vote during the Brexit 
referendum, the continued rule of the right-wing nationalist BJP in India, and even Germany is 
now experiencing its first competitive eurosceptic party Alternative für Deutschland becoming a 
true third party in German politics. Right-wing populism, and in particular euroscepticism, are 
encroaching upon mainstream politics, and understanding how these types of parties behave is 
becoming a literature of its own. 
 This was not always the case, however, as the previous generation of eurosceptics were 
generally considered political lunatics whose rants and ravings were simply either ignored or 
laughed at as inconsequential to any real political development with the EU. When this research 
project nascently began in 2012, research focused on euroscepticism was still largely a niche 
research agenda. At conferences, relatively few projects were focused on euroscepticism and 
many times there were not even any panels solely devoted to research on eurosceptic parties. 
2 
 
Quite simply, this type of party was not considered to be consequential to European politics. An 
interesting sideshow, no doubt, but not a topic worth expending the requisite effort and time to 
study systematically. Of course, there were a number of scholars who had been researching 
euroscepticism (see Evans 1998; Taggart 1998; Forster 2002; De Vries and Edwards 2009; 
Werts et al. 2013), but general political science had yet to realize what these parties were truly 
capable of achieving. This was not due to any inherent bias against eurosceptic parties, since 
Green parties and regionalist parties had also been largely neglected by researchers. By spring of 
2017, though, everyone has realized that hard euroscepticism
1
 does have a tangible effect on 
European politics. 
 Previously, as noted in Spoon (2007; 2009; 2011), Green parties were not thought to be 
rational political actors and were dismissed as unimportant to political science research. 
Likewise, eurosceptic parties have only relatively recently become the focus of larger amounts of 
scholarly research. At times, it has been easy to dismiss hard eurosceptic politicians and parties 
as irrational ideologues who rant and rave nonsensically about perceived injustices originating 
from the EU. In public speeches or on television news shows, hard eurosceptics have routinely 
given in to over-the-top rhetoric and blustery monologues that often leave even sympathetic 
softly anti-EU viewers scratching their head. Emotion appeared to be the sole driver of their 
political arguments. There has also been an inherent contradiction between hard eurosceptics 
rhetoric and their professional activities within the European Parliament (EP). In public, these 
eurosceptics were fiery in their opposition to the EU, but legislatively many of them failed to 
show up to their day jobs within the EP on a regular basis. So sharp was the distinction between 
                                                          
1
 “Hard” eurosceptics are to be understood as a different type of eurosceptic party from “soft” eurosceptics. Hard 
eurosceptics see no point at all in having an EU, and these are typically niche parties whose sole ideology is anti-
EU. Soft eurosceptics tend to be center-right, mainstream parties that disagree with certain issues of the EU and 
usually EU enlargement and deepening; but, they do not seek to disband the entire union altogether. 
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the various eurosceptic parties in Europe that several typologies emerged (see Brack 2012; 2013; 
Usherwood and Startin 2013). The first type does not even bother to phone it in or even to 
pretend to care about the job of being an elected MEP. This type does not bother to give many 
EP speeches or pose many EP questions that could have shown their willingness to fight for their 
ideological and policy goals.  On the other hand, some eurosceptics are quite active while in 
Brussels or Strasbourg as elected MEPs, and this second type takes the job seriously even if they 
do not see any value in having an EU. This engaged eurosceptic makes anti-EU speeches on the 
floor of the EP, demonstrating to all that they are willing to fight the beast from within its elected 
branch belly. The third type is a soft eurosceptic who generally takes the job seriously, but who 
is not there to give fiery speeches or lambast EU bureaucrats. Typically this third type of 
eurosceptic belongs to a mainstream, center-right party that is eurosceptic to an extent, but that 
generally does not believe that the EU ought to be scrapped altogether. 
 I am most interested in the first two types of eurosceptic. Largely hailing from niche 
parties, these two types of eurosceptic parties are not mainstream politicians. Their parties are 
not forming national governments like the Tories in the UK or the ODS party in the Czech 
Republic. These eurosceptics have no hope of national parliamentary dominance, so there is no 
need to use the EP as a way to train future party leaders. For hard eurosceptic niche parties, seats 
in the EP are oftentimes the only elected positions they have outside of municipal and other local 
elected offices, and yet many of them do not seem willing to assume their EP seats and to 
become engaged. Other hard eurosceptics do, and even though they do not have the numbers to 
affect any EP legislative outcomes, they take full advantage of the European platform to espouse 
their anti-EU views in speeches and questions. This legislative engagement can then be used to 
demonstrate to their party loyalists that they are worthy of supporting during an EP election. 
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Because of the large difference between engaged and not engaged eurosceptic parties, I expect to 
see another difference emerge. I expect to see an electoral difference between these two types of 
hard eurosceptics. 
Due to the types of speeches they make, and the sort of language they employ, it can be 
difficult to realize that some of these eurosceptics are actually quite calculating in how they act 
and in what they say. Nigel Farage is perhaps the quintessential engaged eurosceptic MEP. 
Routinely taking to the mic on the EP floor, he regularly proceeds to insult EU and EP officials, 
other MEPs, and most notoriously the EU flag and national anthem which he compared to Nazi-
era propaganda. Far from the previous notions of a eurosceptic MEP not bothering to take part in 
EP legislative behavior, Farage appears to enjoy the moment. He often has a smile on his face 
even when being booed and heckled by non-eurosceptic MEPs. While his disdain for all things 
EU was clear, his behavior suggested an MEP who enjoyed the process of parliamentary debate. 
I suggest that this type of demeanor was about much more than enjoying the limelight. For 
UKIP, and other like-minded eurosceptic parties, this type of EP engagement also meant the 
creation of social media videos and elevated levels of traditional media coverage. Had UKIP not 
been an engaged eurosceptic party within the EP it is very much likely that the Leave vote during 
the Brexit referendum would have handily failed, since the Leave campaign would not have had 
the social media infrastructure, and large cache of UKIP eurosceptic EP speeches, at its disposal 
going into the vote. 
My theory is predicated on the electoral differences between the  eurosceptic parties that 
are active and engaged in the EP and those eurosceptic parties that adopt a more passive 
approach. In observing that many eurosceptic parties do not over perform in EP elections, the 
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question beckons on why that is the case.
2
 Furthermore, if there exist electoral differences 
between niche party eurosceptics, then one would predict that there would also be observable 
differences in other characteristics between these two groups. I answer this question of why there 
is an electoral difference by highlighting the stark differences in EP legislative behavior between 
engaged eurosceptic parties (largely those in the Freedom and Democracy EP group) and non-
engaged eurosceptic parties (largely those parties in the Not-Attached EP group).   
The engaged eurosceptic will recognize when and where to combat the EU publicly, and 
will use precise language to portray the EU as hostile toward Europeans’ self-interest. When 
done correctly, not only will the engaged eurosceptic succeed in reformulating the debate, but to 
the casual observer can even appear at times to be the sole level-headed MEP at a plenary 
session. Repeated references to the liberty of individuals, to the freedom from a bureaucratic 
autocracy, and to the logic that one ought to be allowed to be proud of their national heritage are 
common themes when engaged eurosceptics speak on the EP floor. Moreover, parties such as 
UKIP will repeatedly denounce racism and insist that it is not xenophobia that is driving their 
ideological opposition to the EU, but rather a strong sense of national sovereignty that is the 
driving force behind their ideology.  
This is in clear contrast to many non-engaged eurosceptic parties. Not only do they fail to 
take advantage of the bully pulpit that the EP provides, but they tend to show up to EP plenary 
sessions less often than do the engaged eurosceptics. The non-engaged eurosceptic also tends to 
become bogged down in debates with racist and xenophobic undertones. This aspect cannot be 
overlooked when comparing different typologies of eurosceptics, since it helps to explain why 
otherwise like-minded parties such as UKIP and the French Front National (FN) do not see 
                                                          
2
 By “over perform” I refer to a party that does better in EP elections than they do in national parliamentary 
elections. Since Reif and Schmitt (1980), EP elections have been considered to be second-order elections in which 
opposition and niche parties are expected to benefit electorally. 
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themselves as natural allies beyond both opposing the EU. While Nigel Farage will go to great 
lengths to distance himself publicly from overtly xenophobic statements, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and 
to a lesser extent Marine Le Pen, will seamlessly insert crass xenophobic comments into their 
interviews and speeches. The engaged eurosceptic will make the most of any opportunity to 
speak in a manner that does not come across as blatantly racist or xenophobic, while the non-
engaged eurosceptic fails to realize the public platform afforded to them by being an MEP and 
instead creates sound clips laden with off-topic and xenophobic comments. One takes advantage 
of the low-cost high-reward situation that the media provide, while the other appears 
disinterested in trying to reach mainstream EP voters who would be open to supporting an anti-
EU party in EP elections. 
The electoral difference between engaged and non-engaged eurosceptic parties are 
observed after an EP election. Naturally, I began to question why certain niche eurosceptic 
parties managed to underperform in EP elections when all conventional thought would predict 
that they would do better in EP elections than they did in their own national parliamentary 
elections (see Reif and Schmitt 1980; Hix and Marsh 2007; 2011). Since the difference in tone 
and EP engagement levels of the two types of niche party eurosceptics is so distinct, a starting 
point is to focus on how each type approach their MEP duties in explaining why non-engaged 
eurosceptics routinely underperformed in EP elections. Those euroceptics who make it easy for 
the media to disseminate their messages perform just as the literature would predict. Conversely, 
the non-engaged eurosceptics do not make it as easy to disseminate their message by not 
participating in EP plenary sessions. Research on the subject matter of EP questions support how 
Not-Attached eurosceptic MEPs (the non-engaged eurosceptics) rarely even troubled themselves 
to make their questions relevant to EU policy when they did show up to work (Jensen et al. 
7 
 
2013). These eurosceptics do not make the most of their EP seats, and a direct result of this is 
that they fail to take full advantage of their standing during EP elections. 
Throughout this dissertation, I will use EP party group as a heuristic for party types 
within the EP. This is not a controversial approach, as previous research has shown that like-
minded parties from various EU member states  join EP groups that are ideologically 
homogeneous (see Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; Kreppel 2002; Hix et al. 2003). An EP party 
group is a caucus of like-minded parties that span the member states of the EU. In the current 8
th
 
EP session (2014-2019), there are eight EP groups and a 9
th
 group of Non-Attached MEPs. 
While the Non-Attached MEPs do not form an EP group in the traditional sense, I treat them as 
if they were a 9
th
 EP group. Additionally, every EP session new EP groups tend to emerge on the 
far-right. Instead of constantly referring to different EP group names, I adopt the EP group 
names that were used during the 7
th
 EP session (2009-20145). During that EP session, there were 
only seven EP groups plus the Not-Attached. A new EP group, Europe of Nations and Freedom, 
emerged after the 2014 EP election that is led by formerly Not-Attached MEP Marine Le Pen. 
Because I posit that EP legislative behavior has an effect on EP electoral results for eurosceptics, 
I will not be able to test this relationship on the 8
th
 EP session until the 2019 EP electoral results 
are published. Therefore, even though such parties as the French FN are now participating 
members of an EP group, they are still considered to be non-engaged eurosceptics for this 
dissertation because that was what they were previous to the 2014 EP elections. 
In Table 1.1, I provide the EP party group names with the member parties that comprise 
the group. While all data were collected at the party-level, I use EP groups to illustrate the 
findings, since these are all parties that generally adhere to the same ideology. Since membership 
in an EP group is voluntary, I assume that parties that join any particular EP group are doing so 
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because they view themselves as ideological colleagues that are merely from a different EU 
member state. 
 
EP Party Group Ideological Description Prominent Examples of 
Member Parties  
European Left-Nordic Green Communist Communist Parties, Socialist 
Parties (such as SF in 
Denmark, Die Linke etc) Sinn 
Fein 
Greens-European Free 
Alliance 
Environmentalist Green Parties, Pirate Party, 
various regionalist parties  
Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists 
Social Democracy Social Democratic Parties, 
Labour Party 
Alliance of Liberals Liberal Liberal Parties, FDP, 
MoDems 
European People’s Party Christian 
Democracy/Conservative 
Christian Democratic Parties, 
CDU/CSU, Republicans 
(UMD), Forza Italia 
European Conservatives and 
Reformists 
Soft 
Euroscepticism/Conservative 
Tories, PiS, New Flemish 
Alliance 
Europe of Freedom and 
Democracy 
Hard Euroscepticism (niche 
parties) 
UKIP, Northern League, 
Danish People’s Party, United 
Poland 
Not-Attached Hard Euroscepticism (niche 
parties) 
National Front, Golden Dawn, 
Jobbik, Vlaams Belang, FPO 
      Table 1.1:  Summary of Party Groups 
 
Not only are parties that join an EP group ideologically similar to the other member parties, but 
when the hard eurosceptic EP groups are analyzed more closely the general electoral outcomes 
of the member parties are also very similar. As is shown in Table 1.2, over or underperformance 
by niche eurosceptic parties largely aligns with a specific EP group. Not-Attached parties 
generally underperform, while Freedom and Democracy parties generally over perform. So, 
while the data are collected at the party level, they become much easier to digest when illustrated 
at the EP group level. Nonetheless, the fact that so many niche eurosceptic parties routinely 
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underperform in EP elections, and thus behave in contradiction to what the literature would 
predict, warrants a closer examination of why this unpredicted phenomenon is occurring. 
 
Underperforming Eurosceptic 
Parties 
Mean 
Change 
in Vote 
Share  
# of EP Elections 
Underperformed 
(since winning 
an EP seat) 
Historical EP 
Group 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (AT)          
Vlaams Belang (BE) 
True Finns (FI) 
Front National (FR) 
British National Party (UK) 
Jobbik (HU) 
Lega Nord (IT) 
Slovak National Party (SK) 
-3.21 
-.44 
-6.2 
-.72 
-.76 
-5.5 
-.53 
-.94 
4/4 
3/5 
1/1 
4/6 
1/1 
1/1 
1/3* 
1/1 
Not-Attached 
Not-Attached 
ECR 
Not-Attached 
Not-Attached 
Not-Attached 
Not-Attached 
Freedom/Democracy 
Over performing Eurosceptic 
Parties 
Mean 
Change 
in Vote 
Share  
# of EP Elections 
Underperformed 
(since winning 
an EP seat) 
Historical EP 
Group 
Dansk Folkeparti (DK) 
UKIP (UK) 
Order and Justice (LT) 
Partij voor de Vrijheid (NL) 
Partidul România Mare (RO) 
3.4 
17.8 
3.23 
3.24 
3.48 
1/3 
0/3 
1/2 
0/1 
0/2 
Freedom/Democracy 
Freedom/Democracy 
Freedom/Democracy 
Not-Attached 
Not-Attached 
       Table 1.2:  Over and Underperformers 
 
 
Niche and opposition parties are predicted to over perform in EP elections, but as is noted in 
Table 1.2, this is hardly the case when it comes to niche eurosceptic parties. In fact, there are 
more niche eurosceptic parties that underperform in EP elections than there are that over 
perform. Concomitantly, there are niche eurosceptic parties that engage while in the EP, and 
there are those whose participation is negligible. Both electorally and in terms of EP legislative 
behavior, these two types of niche eurosceptic parties align strongly with a particular EP group. 
The Freedom and Democracy parties are more engaged and they generally over perform in EP 
elections. The Not-Attached parties are less engaged and they generally underperform in EP 
elections. 
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 While I do not use an overabundance of acronyms throughout this dissertation, I do 
regularly refer to a number of them. To help the reader, I have included a list of acronyms in 
Table 2 in the Appendix. I define each acronym in the body of the dissertation, but for a quick 
reference one can turn to the Appendix. 
Previous work on niche parties has tended to focus solely on extreme right-wing parties 
(see van der Brug et al. 2000; Norris 2005; Werts et al. 2013), or Green Parties (see Rudig 1985; 
1988; Spoon 2011). I focus primarily on eurosceptic parties by highlighting the differences 
between engaged eurosceptics and non-engaged eurosceptics. I include other parties, however, in 
order to provide a fuller explanation and understanding of the electoral effects that EP legislative 
behavior has. Moreover, by directly comparing not only engaged versus non-engaged 
eurosceptics, but also niche parties on the left versus niche party eurosceptics on the right and the 
various EP groups to one another, that a more complete picture is drawn that shows how 
surprising it is that there exist niche eurosceptic parties that fail to over perform in EP elections. 
Additionally, in showing how the media, both social and traditional, play a role in 
disseminating parties’ messages and conveying information to voters, I am able highlight the 
relationship between parties and the media, and the relationship between the media and voters. 
Higher levels of EP participation by parties posing questions lead to substantially higher levels of 
media coverage. When taken in conjunction with the amount of media that is consumed by the 
public, the relationship between EP legislative behavior, the media, and the public becomes 
clear. 
The engaged eurosceptic already knows this and has been actively engaging in 
grandstanding for some time. The non-engaged eurosceptic continues to ignore this EP 
engagement-the media-voters relationship to the result of consistently underperforming in EP 
11 
 
elections. In this dissertation, I present my theory for why some eurosceptic parties underperform 
while others do not. I posit that EP legislative behavior matters even if EP elections are generally 
considered to be second-order and merely referenda on national government performance. Via 
social and traditional media outlets, engaged eurosceptic parties can maximize their second-order 
election benefits because they are engaged at the EP level.  
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Chapter II 
Theory of Engaged Euroscepticism 
 
As the literature into eurosceptic parties has grown over the years, several models have emerged 
that begin to explain this phenomenon (see Kitschelt 1997; Veugelers and Magnan 2005; 
Arzheimer and Carter 2006). In this chapter, I present a theory based on European Parliamentary 
(EP) legislative behavior and its effects on over or under performance in EP elections. As an 
ideology, euroscepticism is inherently a protest movement. I posit that its parties must appeal to 
their supporters in a fashion that is different from how mainstream parties reinforce their 
supporters’ intent to vote in EP elections. As a protest movement, eurosceptic parties must 
publicly display their opposition to the EU and its institutions in order to invigorate their 
supporters to cast votes for them in an election that they do not believe should exist in the first 
place. Public grandstanding and actively participating in EP legislative activity is one avenue by 
which eurosceptic parties can achieve this goal.   
The consensus of second-order election literature is that being in the opposition or a niche 
party is sufficient to realize electoral gains in elections such as the EP (Reif and Schmitt 1980; 
Marsh 1998). This has not been the case, however, for parties such as the Front National (FN) or 
the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPO). In fact, only briefly within the extremist party 
literature has it been noted that the FN does not generally realize their expected second-order 
electoral gains in EP elections. Givens (2005) acknowledges this electoral phenomenon, but she 
glosses over it as it was not the central focus of her book on the radical right. Had this 
phenomenon only occurred once or twice, it could be accepted as an outlier to the literature. 
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Because this has occurred numerous times by a handful of eurosceptic parties, however, it 
warrants further explanation for when and why it occurs.  
In Table 2.1, I show a depiction of the puzzle that I seek to solve. Eurosceptic parties are 
either engaged or not engaged in the EP legislative process via questions and attendance at EP 
plenary sessions. These parties are then placed in the cell that corresponds to whether they over 
performed or underperformed in EP elections. 
 
Active EP Engagement  Passive EP Engagement 
 
Over 
Performs 
 
 
 
 
Under 
Performs 
    Table 2.1: Engagement and Electoral Interaction of Parties 
  
I propose an explanation that emphasizes legislative behavior as a driving force behind 
eurosceptic EP electoral success. Economic conditions and domestic governing status clearly 
play roles in second-order election outcomes, but I control for these factors to isolate how 
legislative behavior affects parties’ EP vote shares. The more publicly obstinate a eurosceptic 
party can behave while in the EP, the better it can position itself to maximize its EP vote share. 
UKIP (Uk) 
Dansk Folkeparti (Dk) 
Order and Justice (Lt) 
 
 
Partij voor de Vrijheid (Nl) 
Partidul România Mare (Ro) 
True Finns (Fi) 
Slovak National Party (Sk) 
 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (At)          
National Front (Fr) 
Jobbik (Hu) 
Northern League (It) 
Vlaams Belang (Be) 
British National Party (Uk) 
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I calculate over or under performance in EP elections by subtracting the previous national 
parliamentary election vote share from that party’s subsequent EP election vote share. In the 
formula below, VS refers to the vote share a party receives during an election. This is the 
percentage of the total vote, which I take to the tenth decimal point. VS(EPt) refers to the vote 
share the party receives in a specific EP election, while VS(Pt-1) refers to the vote share the party 
receives in the previous national parliamentary election. I subtract VS(Pt-1) from VS(EPt) in order to 
calculate the ∆VS.  This will indicate whether a party underperformed (∆VS < 0) or over 
performed in an EP election (∆VS > 0). 
VS(EPt)-VS(Pt-1)=∆VS 
For example, because the FN received an 11.1% vote share in the 2002 French 
parliamentary election and a 9.8% vote share in the 2004 EP election, I subtract 11.1 from 9.8 to 
result in a change in vote share of -1.3. This would be an underperformance. Conversely, the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) had a 1.5% vote share in the 2001 UK General 
Elections and a 16.2% vote share in the 2004 EP elections to give them a change in vote share of 
14.7. In this case, this would be an over performance. I calculate the change in vote share with 
the EP election minus domestic election so that it is more intuitive of whether a certain party 
performed better or worse in the EP election. A positive change in vote share reflects over 
performance, while a negative change in vote share reflects an underperformance. 
The table below differentiates between eurosceptic parties that over perform and those 
that under perform in EP elections. Concurrently, it also separates these parties by whether they 
generally are active in the EP by attending plenary sessions and posing questions. What becomes 
clear is that over or under performance appears to be correlated with active or passive behavior 
in the EP, respectively. 
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If this relationship between EP legislative behavior and EP electoral success is as closely 
related as what Table 2.1 suggests, then my theory will shed light on this by providing a possible 
explanation to a phenomenon that has not been truly identified by the extant literature by 
proposing that public grandstanding and the public attention that results from outspoken EP 
legislative behavior have electoral effects for eurosceptic parties in EP elections. Euroscepticism 
has become an entrenched force in European politics. Eurosceptic parties and the far right saw 
notable electoral successes in the 2014 EP, and further success in national elections in Greece, 
Denmark and Poland since.  Moreover, the UK’s referendum vote to leave the EU showcased 
how eurosceptics such as UKIP’s Nigel Farage and the Tories’ Boris Johnson were able to create 
public spectacles highlighting their side’s cause in hopes of mobilizing sympathetic anti-EU 
voters. The goal of this dissertation is that a legislative behavior theory for EP euroscecptic 
electoral success is able to fill some voids within the literature. Moreover, it can be generalizable 
to other parliamentary systems that include MPs from small, yet outspoken, parties. In breaking 
with previous second-order election literature, I argue that there is more to EP electoral success 
for eurosceptic parties than domestic political factors and protest voting. As the EP is a supra-
national parliament, legislative behavior at the supra-national level ought to have an electoral 
impact on EP elections. Eurosceptic parties are likely to be more electorally sensitive to this 
impact, since they are relatively much smaller than mainstream parties, and they rarely take part 
in governing coalitions in their national parliaments. 
 
Eurosceptic Parties and Second-Order Elections 
Second-order elections are those elections upon which voters assign lower importance. National, 
or general, elections are understood to be the most important elections to most voters. While 
16 
 
Europe is an ideal setting for studying second-order elections, this type of election can be found 
in most parliamentary democracies. In fact, there are numerous forms of second-order elections 
that devolve from national non-general elections to regional and municipal elections. Each type 
has its own peculiarities and voter turnout rates, but unites these various forms of second-order 
elections is that voters have traditionally not perceived them to be as important as first-order 
ones. 
 Arguably, the earliest research into second-order elections can be traced back to research 
into US midterm elections. Tufte (1975) found that US midterm election voters tended to punish 
the incumbent President’s party. In many ways, US midterm elections were behaving like 
referenda on the President’s performance in office. Instead of critiquing an individual 
Congressperson or Senator, voters were critiquing the US President’s accomplishments even 
though he was not on the ballot. Several years later, this type of election was labeled a second-
order election in the comparativist literature. 
EP elections have become, perhaps, the most important of the second-order elections in 
Europe. Research into EP elections has confirmed them to be second-order elections due to the 
difference in motivations that EP voters were placing while casting their votes. (see Reif and 
Schmitt 1980; Marsh 1998). Because voters do not prioritize this type of election, second order 
elections generally have lower voter turnout rates. Researchers have observed that second-order 
elections are fertile grounds for elevated levels of protest voting (see Hobolt, Spoon, and Tilley 
2008; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011).  In such elections, highly motivated groups of voters can have 
unexpectedly large influence on election results (see Hobolt and Spoon 2012).   
Small, opposition parties that build their support on challenges to the established parties 
can often thrive in second order elections. Thus, while mainstream and governing parties tend to 
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lose votes in most second-order elections, those parties that are either niche or in the opposition 
will be able to over perform because voters who would not normally cast their vote for that 
particular party replaced their lost votes. Eurosceptic parties are typically both niche and in the 
opposition domestically, and as such this type of party should not be underperforming in EP 
elections. If they are underperforming, and there are multiple examples of eurosceptic parties 
failing to take advantage of their second-order election advantage, then an explanation is needed 
that addresses this electoral deficiency found with certain eurosceptic parties. 
Previous work focusing on niche parties predicts a clear electoral benefit for niche and 
opposition parties in EP elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Simply being a niche party is 
assumed to be sufficient for over performance in EP elections by the literature, which has never 
directly acknowledged that some eurosceptic parties do not conform to consensus. Moreover, it 
has been shown that parties can benefit electorally from opposing the EU (Hobolt et al. 2008; 
Hobolt and Wittrock 2011). If parties benefit electorally by casting themselves as eurosceptic, 
then it makes sense for eurosceptic parties to make their euroscepticism as visible as possible. I 
extend this logic to observations of eurosceptic behavior in the EP. In particular, I am interested 
in determining whether this type of legislative behavior is able to reinforce the public perception 
of a eurosceptic party’s opposition to the EU. If so, is active engagement in anti-EU rhetoric a 
necessary condition for a euroceptic party to realize their second-order gains? Empirical 
evidence that this is the case would establish legislative activities as an important electoral tool 
for eurosceptics to project their anti-EU bona fides. 
 There is still debate about whether, and to what extent, second-order elections involve 
issue saliency on topics outside of the domestic political sphere. Using survey data, those voters 
who saw little benefit in what the EU had to offer had elevated abstention rates in EP elections 
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(Blondel et al. 1998). Eurosceptic parties will need their euroceptic party loyalists to show up at 
the polls, and they cannot rely disproportionately on protest votes from voters who would 
normally prefer a mainstream party to support. If Blondel et al. are correct, and it still holds that 
the EU has not assumed a more central role in voters’ minds, then eurosceptic parties face an 
uphill battle when mobilizing their supporters. In this case, eurosceptic parties must seek avenues 
to energize their core constituents to arrive at the polls. The best way to combat eurosceptic 
voters’ apathy could be to remind them via grandstanding in the EP that their votes are not 
wasted, and it is worth the time and effort for eurosceptic voters to cast their votes. Public 
grandstanding during EP sessions is a cost-effective way to signal to eurosceptic voters that a 
party is serious about fulfilling campaign promises. I believe that it is reasonable to assume that 
if a eurosceptic party’s MEPs are sufficiently loud while protesting the EU during EP sessions 
that this legislative behavior can mitigate voter apathy issues that some have found to be inherent 
in EP election cycles and in particular among the eurosceptic voting bloc. 
 In more recent research on EP voter abstention, however, Schmitt and van der Eijk 
concluded that “nowhere does anti-EU sentiment play a major role in the decision to participate 
in, or abstain from, EP elections” (2008, 232). If EU sentiment is not a differentiating factor in 
voters choosing whether to cast votes in EP elections, EP legislative behavior could still be the 
central legislative activity by which to demonstrate a eurosceptic party’s willingness to oppose 
the EU from within its own parliament. In this case, such legislative behavior would not be 
needed to overcome a distinct eurosceptic voter apathy, since eurosceptics would behave 
similarly to non-eurosceptic voters. Here, it would signal a reinforcement to eurosceptic voters 
that a party is willing to fight for their cause. In the end, eurosceptic legislative behavior 
functions generally in the same fashion regardless of whether there is a distinct difference in 
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eurosceptic voters’ electoral behavior. The only difference would be the amount of voter apathy 
a eurosceptic party must overcome via its EP legislative behavior. 
The amount of voter apathy should not be adversely affecting eurosceptic parties to the 
point that they manage to do worse in EP elections than they do in national parliamentary 
elections, since generally any loses should be alleviated from the votes these parties gain from 
protest and sincere voters defecting from mainstream parties. If a disaffected eurosceptic voter 
fails to cast an EP vote for a far-right party, that vote can be made up with a mainstream voter 
deciding to send a message to the mainstream parties by voting for a far-right, eurosceptic party 
in an election that is perceived as less important than a national parliamentary election.  
Logically, voter abstention rates are assumed to be positively correlated to voter apathy 
rates. In large regard, voter abstention rates are simply the macro-level results of micro-level 
voter apathy sentiment. While voter abstention rates must be taken into account for analyses of 
EP elections, a second dimension emerges that appears to separate eurosceptic parties and MEPs 
into different typologies based on EP legislative behavior. Just as with individual voters, MEPs 
can also behave in legislatively apathetic fashion by abstaining from EP legislative debate and 
activity. I posit that eurosceptic MEPs can seek to mitigate high levels of voter apathy by 
signaling to euroscpetic that it worthwhile to cast EP votes by actively engaging the EP 
legislative process. Consequentially, if eurosceptic parties can successfully signal their 
legislative activity by publicly grandstanding during EP legislative debate, they ought to be able 
to lower eurosceptic voter abstention rates. 
Taggart (1998) finds evidence that EU issue saliency matters, but it is really only to be 
found for the parties on the ideologically extreme fringes. Since those ideological positions are 
precisely where eurosceptic parties are found, this supports the notion that EP elections are not 
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simply referenda on domestic political issues, and that EP legislative behavior can be a 
successful avenue by which grandstanding eurosceptic MEPs can reinforce their bona fides to 
the eurosceptic voting bloc. Additionally, he identifies four different ways that euroscepticism 
can manifest itself within parties: Eurosceptic Parties, Protest Parties with Euroscepticism, 
Established Parties with Euroscepticism, and Parties with Eurosceptic Factions (1998, 368). 
With different types of euroscepticism existing one expects that there also would be 
differentiating factors such as legislative behavior, campaigning behavior, or general importance 
placed by the party on winning EP seats. Because legislative behavior can provide the foundation 
for campaigning and public grandstanding, I expect the differences between eurosceptic parties 
to be most stark in this arena. 
Focusing on euroscepticism and EU integration, Vasilopoulou (2009; 2011) finds 
evidence that there are clear differences between eurosceptic parties. Additionally, she highlights 
that these differences can also be observed in party behavior and attitude. Here, she identifies 
three types of eurosceptic party behavior toward further EU integration: The Rejecting 
Eurosceptic Party, The Conditional Euroscpetic Party, and The Compromising Eurosceptic 
Party. Likewise with Taggart (1998), Vasilopoulou identifies eurosceptic party typology, which 
provides evidence that there is likely to be different party attitudes toward EP legislative 
behavior and engagement. 
 Brack (2013) examines the issue of different types of eurosceptics, but she switches 
focues to the micro-level. According to Brack, individual MEPs can be categorized into several 
types including: The Absentee, The Public Orator, and The Pragmatist (92-99). It appears that 
these same three types of eurosceptic MEPs roughly fit the three main EP Groups for 
eurosceptics, namely: The Not-Attached (the absentee), The Freedom and Democracy (the 
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public orator), and The Conservatives and Reformists (the pragmatist). While this dissertation 
does not address the mechanism of how or why political parties decide which party group to join 
once they are elected to the EP, there is likely to be something driving these parties to act in a 
way that forces their inclusion into specific EP groups (see McElroy and Benoit 2010).  
If euroscepticism were as monolithic as the Greens, then there would be no reason to 
have multiple eurosceptic EP party groups. Particularly among the niche party eurosceptics, there 
is no logical reason to divide an ideology into two separate camps, which only diminishes the 
relative power they would have otherwise. That this occurs suggests that there is likely to be 
observable differences in EP legislative behavior between eurosceptic parties that join an 
established EP party group and those eurosceptic parties that remain Not Attached. Furthermore, 
if there is a clear difference in EP electoral success between these niche eurosceptic groups then 
a theory incorporating EP legislative behavior as a causal variable in EP electoral over or under 
performance has an intuitive foundation. Because scholars have identified multiple eurosceptic 
typologies based on different observable behaviors, these differences lead us to question whether 
there will also be electoral difference between the different typologies of eurosceptic parties 
within the EP. If these electoral disparities exist, which they do, then there ought to be a reason 
that certain eurosceptic parties fail to over perform when they are the type of party that is best 
suited to do well in EP elections. 
 
Over Performance/Under Performance 
Niche parties are expected to do better in second-order elections than they do in first-
order ones. Greens and most eurosceptic parties do exceedingly well in EP elections. Regardless 
of ideological positions, these parties can expect better electoral showings in EP elections than 
they can expect to do in their domestic parliamentary elections where voters are more likely to 
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support a mainstream party that places an emphasis on winning seats and that is competitive in 
seeking to govern. The difference in a party’s electoral results of domestic, parliamentary 
elections and second-order, EP elections is that party’s over performance or underperformance 
for EP elections. Simply put, over performance for my theory is when a party does better in EP 
elections than it does in its domestic parliamentary elections as measured by vote share. For my 
model’s specifications, I only use official electoral results, so a party cannot over or 
underperform in an EP election based on expected electoral performance.  
The dependent variable throughout most of this dissertation is a change in vote share. By 
comparing a party’s vote share in a national parliamentary election to the vote share it receives in 
the subsequent EP election, I am able to gain an understanding of whether a party is doing 
relatively better or relatively worse when they are competing for seats in the EP. Particularly for 
niche parties, change in vote share is a telling sign of whether a party is behaving electorally as 
the literature predicts they would. Namely, for these types of political parties second-order 
elections represent the best chance they have for winning parliamentary seats of any kind. In the 
preceding section, a brief literature review outlined the reasons why non-mainstream 
eurosceptics, or hard eurosceptics, should routinely over perform in EP elections.  
According to the literature there should only be positive changes in vote share for niche 
parties, and certainly this should be the case for niche, eurosceptic parties that are thought to be 
advantaged by being both a recipient of protest voting and an ideological opponent of the EU. In 
the event that a niche, eurosceptic party has a negative change in vote share it would be behaving 
in opposition to scholarly consensus. If this underperformance is repeated by other eurosceptic 
parties, and is observed over multiple EP elections, then there must be some sort of effort aimed 
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at explaining why these eurosceptics are not behaving electorally as the literature and consensus 
would have them. 
Angry and Strategic; Not Angry or Strategic 
My theory assumes that MEPs, and eurosceptic niche parties in general, are rational strategic 
actors. Therefore, I assume that all parties want to win as many votes and seats as possible 
regardless of whether an election is second-order.  I remain agnostic as to whether a party is 
office-seeking or policy-seeking because parties are most likely to be a combination of both, not 
to mention that a party cannot truly seek policy change in the absence of any office holding. 
Therefore, I assume that parties, regardless of whether they are mainstream or niche, want to 
perform as best they can electorally during any election. Because I focus on eurosceptic parties’ 
over or underperformance in EP elections relative to their performance in national parliaments, 
my theory questions why these eurosceptics do not take advantage of the second-order election 
benefits that should be propelling them to higher vote shares when competing at the EP level. 
Engaged eurosceptic parties will realize the value of grandstanding during EP pleneary 
sessions. Furthermore, previous research using spatial modeling found that parties and firms will 
act in accordance to maximize their vote share (see Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957). If parties 
perceived an electoral advantage by centripetally shifting their policy positions, and they 
proceeded to do so, then parties are independent actors capable of influencing their electoral 
outcomes via conscious decisions of how to position themselves ideologically. Using spatial 
modeling to illustrate how voters will choose their preferred party relative to the voters’ bliss 
point, this theory requires voters to be informed. Moreover, parties are capable of similarly 
strategic behavior that they believe will best transmit to voters who are consuming media. 
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Likewise, later evolution to proximity models further reinforced the notion that voters 
will behave strategically while casting their vote. To frame this activity theoretically, voters will 
have a utility function that is negatively related to where a party is positioned ideologically 
relative to the voter’s ideal point (see Enelow and Hinich 1984). Again, this type of micro-level 
modeling is focused on the voter, while parties are essentially exogenous actors behaving 
independently of voters. If the micro-level focus of the voter-party relationship is reversed, 
though, can parties be assumed to have the same general type of utility function that includes a 
legislative exposure variable that allows them to get the message out to voters about what they 
are doing legislatively. I suggest that eurosceptic parties have a strategic incentive to provide 
voters with information about their legislative activities while in office that will complement 
their ideological positioning that attracts voters in the first place, particularly for European 
elections that provide them with better electoral outcomes than they have while competing for 
national parliament seats. While spatial, proximity, or directional voting models can help explain 
which party a voter chooses to support; a party’s legislative exposure component can help 
explain why a party’s supporter will choose to cast a vote. 
By referencing spatial and proximity models to eurosceptic niche parties, the notion that 
these parties can choose to behave legislatively as they best see fit is reinforced. Viewing parties 
as utility maximizing, unitary actors allows them to be modeled similarly to a singular voter’s 
choice in the process of utility maximizing; regardless of whether a voter is policy or 
ideologically minded. Eurosceptic parties, by definition, will have trouble moderating their 
ideological positions, since there are already large mainstream parties inhabiting the center-right 
portion of the ideological spectrum. Thus, in order to maximize their vote share, eurosceptic 
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parties will have a utility function that incentivized their public grandstanding and active 
legislative behavior while in the EP. 
Moreover, alternative models of voter choice such as directional voting (see Rabinowitz 
1978; Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989) further support a eurosceptic party’s incentive to make 
clear that it has ownership over its ideological position of opposing the EU and is the most 
equipped party to do act on that ideology. For individual voters, casting a pragmatic, sincere, or 
directional vote is a mutually exclusive behavior in that their choice cannot include multiple 
motivations unless there is an overlap that is coincidental.
3
 For a eurosceptic party, however, 
there need not be any distinction between sincere and directional voter motivations because both 
types of voters can be equally drawn to casting an EP vote for a eurosceptic party. Pragmatic 
voter motivations are largely absent in EP elections because there is no ruling party in the sense 
that a singular party will oftentimes dominate a national parliamentary system after an election. 
Laid bare, voter choice is a question of why a certain voter casts a vote for a certain party, parties 
care only about if and how they can secure a cast vote. 
Niche parties will not be ideologically centripetal in nature, and in fact could be punished 
if they are not ideologically centrifugal (see Adams et al. 2006), the underlying principle that 
parties are able to position themselves is indicative of a party being capable of being strategic 
even if a particular party is a relatively small niche one. Eurosceptic parties have an underlying 
incentive not to alienate their supporter base, in fact for this type of party that is not a catch-all 
party, there are increased marginal costs in losing supporters relative to mainstream parties that 
are much larger and that can compete for centrist voters as well as those found firmly in their 
respective side of the ideological spectrum. 
                                                          
3
 For example, a voter can be both pragmatic and sincere if he casts a vote for a mainstream party likely to win the 
election because he truly supports that party’s positions more so than any other party’s. 
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Formal modeling can be used, as well, to explain eurosceptic parties’ strategic behavior 
in EP elections. Grofman (1985) presents a model that incorporates party “competence” and 
“situational constraints” (233) into a voter’s calculation in casting a vote. Like other models, this 
assumes a sophisticated voter capable of paying attention not only to party behavior, but also to 
the institutional constraints of changing the status quo. While there is no explicit mention of how 
parties can affect the voter’s choice calculation, there is an implicit assumption that parties 
would be in control of their messaging to convey institutional constraint information, and most 
importantly that party’s competence to effect change. Applying this theoretical foundation to 
eurosceptic parties vying for EP seats, those eurosceptics who make clear their competence to 
oppose the EU would reinforce faith among ideologically sympathetic voters that they are worth 
their votes, while legislatively unengaged eurosceptic parties would not be reinforcing their 
competence to the ideologically sympathetic voting bloc. 
 In a more applied version of parties and politicians as strategic actors, Mayhew (1974) 
focused on what US Congressional politicians appeared to hold as most important: Getting re-
elected. In order to dispel any notions that re-election or electoral outcomes are simply some 
predestined political occurrence, Mayhew shows that politicians are self-interested, rational 
actors. If they are not, then logically political Darwinism will remove them from the political 
landscape at some point. This appears to be the case with eurosceptic niche parties. If the FN 
under Jean-Marie Le Pen was not willing to put in the work required to expand his party’s EP 
vote share, then it would continue to underperform in EP elections. Legislative behavior has 
electoral consequences, and a party or politician who behaves passively cannot expect to be 
rewarded in elections. Thus, whether Nigel Farage publicly remonstrates against the EU because 
he sees an electoral benefit from doing so, or because he simply enjoys performing political skits 
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in the EP is inconsequential. The point is that he does this behavior, and that it enables UKIP to 
over perform in EP elections because it signals to euroscpetic voters that voting for UKIP is 
voting to oppose actively the EU. 
 Work on American parties and elections, as well as on the U.S. Congress, has a long 
history of incorporating theory and positivism into coherent works that explain electoral 
outcomes. Elections are not won or lost due to predestined occurrences or derived from the ether. 
While mainstream parties will hold advantages over niche parties in certain political arenas, in 
EP elections all bets are off. In these elections, niche parties benefit on a number of fronts, and as 
such they are able to take advantage of these benefits or they can behave passively and leave it 
up to chance whether they do well or not. Those eurosceptic niche parties that do not behave 
passively do not leave their electoral outcomes to chance, and they are able to maximize their 
vote share by acting strategically.  
 
Niche Parties, Ideologies, and Voters 
My theory includes a number of assumptions. While there will continue to be debates around 
how rational or strategic political parties and politicians are, none of these assumptions is new or 
controversial. In fact, all of the following assumptions are routinely included either explicitly or 
implicitly in rationalist works on parties and elections. That being said, I stress the notion that 
these same assumptions are still valid for niche eurosceptic parties that do not always appear to 
be behaving in the same fashion as do mainstream parties.   
First, parties are assumed to be rational and prefer higher vote shares to lower vote shares 
(see Downs 1957; Mayhew 1974; Muller and Strom 1999). Moreover, I assume that voters do 
not vote randomly and without prior consideration for which party best represents their political 
wishes whether they be ideological or pragmatic goals. At times it can appear that eurosceptic 
28 
 
party leaders do not care about how well they do in EP elections. For example, the FN under 
Jean-Marie Le Pen seemed not to care about how its EP electoral results. He routinely never 
bothered to attend EP plenary sessions, and while he always accepted his EP seat and salary he 
typically never put forth much effort to campaign in front of EP elections. The FN under his 
daughter, however, did campaign in the lead up to the 2014 EP election by making media 
appearances in which the EP and its elections were discussed and by putting out traditional 
campaign materials such as posters and party websites. I would argue that the FN under Jean-
Marie Le Pen always preferred to do better rather than worse in EP elections. The difference 
between Le Pen father and daughter, though, was that Marine Le Pen was more willing to put in 
the hard work necessary to compete successfully in EP elections. If Jean-Marie Le Pen truly did 
not care about the FN’s EP vote share then he could have given his EP seat to another FN party 
leader, but he never did that which indicates that he cared enough to win a seat for himself in the 
EP even if he did not care enough to campaign and try to win more EP seats for his FN party 
colleagues. 
Intuitively it is a eurosceptic party’s best interest to want to do as well as possible in EP 
elections. UKIP’s Nigel Farage was actively opposed to the EU from within the EP for nearly 
two decades. Had UKIP taken the approach that it would not accept seats within a parliament 
that it did not agree should even exist in the first place, Farage likely would not have had the 
impact he did during the Brexit vote in 2016. A Brexit-type vote in France is the preferred 
outcome of the FN as well, and following UKIP’s lead it becomes clear that there is an incentive 
for eurosceptic parties to win EP seats and do perform electorally as best they can in EP 
elections. In the event that a eurosceptic party truly does not care whether they do well or poorly 
in EP elections, then there is no way to systematically analyze their EP electoral performance. In 
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the end, the difference between actively engaged eurosceptics and unengaged ones is not likely 
to be a situation where the latter do not care how they perform electorally in EP elections, but 
simply an issue of how hard they are prepared to work in order to maximize their EP electoral 
results.  
Likewise for eurosceptic voters, even if they refuse to vote in an election they do not 
believe should exist, I argue that they will still prefer that the eurosceptic party will do better in 
EP elections rather than worse. Particularly when social and traditional media allow for an 
outspoken eurosceptic MEP to publicize his or her verbal assault against the EU, eurosceptic 
voters ought to receive elevated utility from knowing and observing eurosceptic MEPs taking on 
the EU and its institutions from within. When this type of legislative behavior is able to be 
witnessed either online or on television, the incentives for a eurosceptic voter to abstain from EP 
elections is minimized, all else being equal. In the event that a eurosceptic voter is contemplating 
whether or not to vote in an EP election, the desire for their party to better than to do worse 
provides a solid foundation upon which a eurosceptic voter is being pushed in the direction of 
casting an EP vote as he or she reaches a decision of whether to vote in an EP election.  
There are some problematic issues that arise, though, when assumptions about strategic 
parties reduce them to single-focused utility maximizers. This approach can mask vital aspects 
that can lead otherwise rational and strategic parties to make poor decisions that lead to worse 
electoral outcomes (see Aldrich 1995). Regardless, even underperforming eurosceptic parties 
should still be regarded as behaving rationally even though they may not be behaving in as 
sophisticated of a manner that one would expect. An instance of this type of situation would be 
Not-Attached eurosceptic parties that do not convey any information about their legislative 
activities to their voting bloc because they are not engaged in the first instance to convey 
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anything. I believe that eurosceptic voters pick up on this, and electorally these unengaged 
eurosceptics fail to fulfill their electoral potential in EP elections.   
 Kedar (2005, 2009) posits that not only are voters paying attention to parties, but that 
they are also prone to voting strategically to advance their desired policy outcomes. 
Compensatory voting inherently requires a high level of sophistication among voters. In her 
work, Kedar finds that in parliamentary elections voters will be willing to vote for parties they 
would not typically support in order to pull governing parties in the direction of the voters’ 
preferred policy outcomes. If this same phenomenon were to be present in EP elections, EP 
voters would have to be attentive to what transpires in Brussels and Strasbourg. While my theory 
does not require voters to be nearly as sophisticated in their knowledge and voting behavior as 
what her theory does, this work provides strong support that voters will vote strategically and 
that they must attention to what politicians do while in parliament. If EP voters pay attention to 
EP legislative behavior at even a fraction of what Kedar finds they did in 1990s across several 
dozen democracies, then eurosceptic parties are acting strategically when they publicly 
grandstand their opposition to the EU in EP legislative debates. 
 To be clear, I believe that there is strong evidence that voters and parties are both 
sophisticated and strategic in their behavior. Work on voter choice and issue voting has 
demonstrated that there are patterns to voting across democracies (see Lichbach and Zuckerman 
2009). Voting is not a random activity. There are two sides to this relationship, however, and 
parties are likely to be as sophisticated and strategic as the voters they seek to appease. 
Research by Meguid (2005, 2008) demonstrates that smaller parties are essentially 
fighting over the scraps left on the table by the larger and mainstream parties. In her work, 
eurosceptic niche parties are not entirely in control of their electoral outcomes, since they can 
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only gain voters when large mainstream parties ignore segments of voters. But, would this hold 
for second-order elections such as EP elections? In these elections, it can be argued that 
ideologically pure niche parties now have the upper hand. Eurosceptic parties such as UKIP can 
now drive the debate, and if they behave strategically these parties now can behave similarly to 
their mainstream opponent in national parliamentary elections. If this is, indeed, the case then it 
is possible to take Meguid’s findings and simply switch the parties. My model posits that niche 
eurosceptic parties gain electoral benefits from their EP legislative behavior, and in EP elections 
it becomes the niche party that is strong and the mainstream parties that are now begging for 
scraps. Should a eurosceptic party abstain from EP legislative behavior, however, then it is 
surrendering its second-order electoral advantage. 
Because eurosceptic parties are typically single-issue parties by their very nature, 
solidifying their ideological position ought not to be as difficult as it is for mainstream parties. 
Large, mainstream parties are more prone to having a wide variety of policy preferences across 
their elite power base and party supporters (see Inglehart 1984; Aldrich 1995). The more 
ideologically heterogeneous a party is the more difficult it will be to speak publically with a 
single and clear voice. Eurosceptic parties do not face this issue, since their opposition to the EU 
works as the glue that binds them all together. This makes public grandstanding, and staking a 
clear claim to a policy position, much easier to accomplish. Failure to become legislatively 
engaged in the EP and to grandstand whenever possible, then, becomes an even larger electoral 
failure, since speaking with one voice is an inherently easier task for a eurosceptic party than it is 
for a larger, mainstream one. Likewise, it would be intuitive that failure to achieve a strong 
public presence would punish eurosceptic parties more harshly than their mainstream 
counterparts. 
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 Focusing on how small parties can survive electorally, Spoon (2009, 2011) sheds light on 
how Greens compete ideologically with center-left mainstream parties in France and the UK. She 
found that there is an ideological sweet spot at which smaller parties are able to maximize their 
electoral outcome vis-à-vis their mainstream party competition. For this to occur, voters have to 
be capable of knowing where parties stand ideologically in order either to punish or to reward 
them electorally. I apply Spoon’s findings to my theory as further evidence that EP voters are 
aware of what MEPs are doing while in session. At the macro-level, if voters in France and the 
UK can create electorally an ideological sweet spot for Greens, then voters are capable of paying 
attention to how eurosceptic parties behave legislatively in the EP. Of course, there are 
ecological issues at play whenever macro-level findings have strongly inferred micro-level 
implications, but Spoon’s work supports the notion that both parties and voters are able to act 
strategically in parliamentary elections. If this occurs in first-order parliamentary elections, then 
it is a smaller step to posit that this could occur in ever-increasingly important EP elections. 
 Adams et al. (2006; 2012) provide evidence that niche parties are able to compete if they 
are ideologically rigid and unambiguous. Their findings that niche party voters will punish niche 
parties if they are seen to be ideologically flexible naturally infers that this type of party can be a 
strategic actor. A logical extension of this argument is that eurosceptic niche parties that behave 
rationally will be acting strategically in signaling to their supporters that they are doubling down 
on their anti-EU ideology, and in being legislatively active in the EP they are fulfilling their 
campaign promises. If niche parties are to be punished for not being ideologically rigid, then the 
best way to reinforce their bona fides is to publicly grandstand against the EU during EP debate. 
Their speeches and legislative behavior can be used to reinforce their eurosceptic ideology to 
potential voters that they are a party worth supporting in EP elections. 
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 Scholarly research on party emergence also demonstrates the ability for eurosceptic 
parties to solidify an ideological position and retain ownership of those issues, particularly in EP 
elections. Hug’s (2001) work on when new parties are created provides insight into how niche 
parties emerge, and similarly how they must behave to survive. Logically, if center-right parties 
held and displayed strong anti-EU and anti-immigration viewpoints eurosceptic niche parties 
such as FN, UKIP, or the FPO would have a difficult time surviving as political parties. Why 
would a eurosceptic voter who is happy with the ideology and legislative behavior of their 
country’s center-right mainstream party choose to cast a vote for an ideologically similar niche 
party that stands almost no chance of winning enough seats to govern? It is in this ideological 
space that eurosceptic voters who feel their ideologically-proximate mainstream party is ignoring 
their wishes can choose to switch their vote to the ideologically pure eurosceptic niche party. 
But, this party will need to signal to this type of voter that it is fundamentally different from the 
center-right mainstream party, and that it will not waver ideologically in its opposition to the EU. 
Legislative behavior is an ideal activity to portray ideological rigidity because it is public and 
can be easily transmitted via the media to voters.   
 Niche party ideological positioning is a growing literature within comparative politics, 
particularly since the far right’s show of strength in the 2014 EP elections. This literature plays a 
central role in explaining possible legislative behavioral objectives in that it shows that niche 
parties are able to be strategic, and that they have some level of power over their electoral 
outcomes. Eurosceptics can choose whether to be active within the EP, and more precisely they 
can choose whether to publicly grandstand in order to signal to voters that they are serious 
parties worth supporting at the polls. 
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Legislative Behavior Matters  
Why are some euroceptics able to take electoral advantage of their status as a niche and protest 
party in second-order EP elections while others are not able to capitalize on their inherent 
electoral advantages? In my model EP legislative behavior matters, and by publicly engaging the 
EP eurosceptics are able to signal to their supporters their willingness to oppose the EU. Voters 
who are open to the notion of voting for a eurosceptic niche party must be publicly reminded that 
their votes are not wasted on MEPs or parties that will abstain from politics once their EP seats 
have been won. EP elections do not hold the importance that national parliamentary or 
presidential elections hold, but I maintain that the EU is now large enough, and its policies wide-
reaching enough, that EP elections are beginning to matter in ways resembling national 
parliamentary elections. If this is, indeed, the case, then parliamentary behavior will begin to 
matter, as well. 
 I assume that parties want to win seats in the EP, even if they do not intend on 
participating. While all parties are rational, some will not be legislatively engaged. It is in this 
distinction that EP electoral results for engaged euroscpetic parties will be predicted to over 
perform while unengaged eurosceptic parties will be predicted too underperform. Parties and 
MEPs will signal their active euroscepticism to voters via various forms of traditional and social 
media. Eurosceptics who fail to legislatively engage the EP, and in doing so publicly confront 
the EU from within, will be the parties that will commonly underperform in EP elections. 
 My argument is sequential in nature. If political parties do not care whether they win EP 
seats, then no model can explain their electoral performance because it will be a random outcome 
preceded by no apparent campaign or legislative behavior choices. It would also mean that voters 
who support such parties do not mind wasting their votes, since the EP’s proportional 
representation election system still rewards parties that do not finish in first place. Furthermore, 
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if a eurosceptic party truly does not care whether they win any EP seats, then the situation 
becomes such that nothing in political science can explain the occurrence. In other words, there 
could be no behavioral explanation because the entire endeavor is left to chance and the whims 
of a party leader who does not care if he is successful. Even if a party’s intention is to leave its 
seats empty as a display of protest, it still has an incentive to win parliamentary seats as a show 
of political defiance. Thus, I argue that even eurosceptic parties that do not engage legislatively 
would still prefer to win EP seats than not to win any at all. 
 I generate three initial hypotheses to test how well eurosceptic and niche parties do 
electorally in EP elections. Before I can put forth any possible explanations for why certain 
eurosceptics do not over perform in EP elections, I must make sure that there exists a group of 
underperforming eurosceptic parties. This initial group of hypotheses are meant to support the 
notion that not all eurosceptic parties adhere to the literature’s predictions concerning EP 
electoral performance. Later clusters of hypotheses will be built upon the 3.1 Hypotheses as I 
expand my argument that public grandstanding and EP engagement differentiate between over 
and underperforming eurosceptic parties. 
Hypothesis 3.1 A: Parties within the eurosceptic Not-Attached EP group will not                         
realize the second-order election boost. 
 
Hypothesis 3.1B:  The eurosceptic Freedom and Democracy EP group parties 
will realize a second order election boost.  
 
Hypothesis 3.1C    Not-Attached parties will do less well than other niche-party 
dominated EP groups (EUL/NGL and G/EFA). 
  
I present a model that posits that EP legislative behavior has an effect on EP electoral over or 
underperformance for eurosceptic parties. EP engagement is envisioned as a causal variable, and 
as such, I expect to find empirical evidence that eurosceptic parties that choose to take the initial 
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step of joining an EP party group are likely to have a higher level of EP legislative activity than 
eurosceptic parties that choose to remain Not-Attached. 
Hypothesis 3.2: The eurosceptic Freedom and Democracy EP group will be more 
active in the EP than will the eurosceptic Not-Attached EP group. 
 
Because I am attempting to measure EP legislative activity, I propose an index that can capture a 
party’s attendance rate at EP plenary sessions and the number of EP questions a party poses. My 
Legislative Exposure Score (LE score), takes both forms of a party’s EP legislative behavior into 
account to provide an index score that can used to compare various eurosceptic parties. LE 
scores are calculated with a party’s total number of MEPs in mind, so each score reflects the 
abstract median MEP’s participation level. Because I believe voters pay attention to, and care 
about, what occurs within the EP, eurosceptic parties that participate at higher levels would be 
predicted to receive higher electoral bumps in EP elections. 
Hypothesis 3.3 A:  Eurosceptic parties Legislative Exposure Score will be 
positively correlated with electoral performance in EP elections. 
Hypothesis 3.3 B: An elevated Legislative Exposure Score is a necessary 
condition for a eurosceptic party to over perform in EP elections. 
 
I address the inherent ecology issue that arises whenever a political phenomenon includes macro-
level data with voting, which is by definition a micro-level activity, by positing that voters are 
signaled a eurosceptic party’s active opposition to the EU via the media. In previous decades, 
eurosceptics were forced to rely on traditional media to relay to voters what they were doing in 
Brussels or Strasbourg. By the 2014 EP elections, however, parties were expanding their social 
media presence in much of Europe (see Rodriguez and Madariaga 2015). In Chapter 4, I address 
this issue in detail, and I show that EP voters are most likely to receive their information via 
various forms of media. This is also highly intuitive, since the costs of obtaining first-hand 
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information concerning EP legislative behavior would be quite high, and the fact that eurosceptic 
voters would not likely enjoy their time at a political institution they do not believe should exist 
in the first place.  
Voters make a conscious decision of whether to cast a vote in an EP election, and it is 
logical that if they feel their vote is wasted they would rather stay at home. Eurosceptic parties 
that actively participated in EP legislative debate signal to their party’s supporters that it is worth 
their time to cast a vote in an EP election. In doing this, actively engaged eurosceptic parties 
position themselves to over perform relative to their national parliamentary showing by taking 
full advantage of their second-order election boosts. 
Hypothesis 4.1:  The public consumes sufficient levels of media outlets to 
be informed of political developments and issues related to the EU.  
Hypothesis 4.2:  Parties will prominently display their EP legislative 
behavior on Facebook and Youtube. 
Hypothesis 4.3:  Parties on the extreme left and right will have a 
disproportionate amount, relative to seat share, of social media presence as 
compared to mainstream parties. 
 
If voters perceive themselves to be adequately informed about EU and EP issues, it would make 
electoral sense for parties do their utmost to advertise their EP legislative behavior. Not only 
would this provide parties with relatively low-cost campaign material, but it would also reinforce 
the notion that they achieving something while seated in the EP. Conversely, even if it is the case 
that voters do not pay attention to EP events, it would be highly unlikely that a party’s supporters 
would punish them for publicizing how their MEPs are legislatively behaving. Parties, and in 
particular eurosceptic parties, are assumed to want to maximize the media and social media 
coverage of their EP activities as a low-cost mechanism to reach their supporters. 
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Engaged eurosceptics use their EP platform to oppose the EU publicly, and they do so in 
ways that easily translate to the media for mass dissemination. Eurosceptic voters are cognizant 
of whether a eurosceptic party is willing to follow through on its campaign promises to fight the 
EU because they can view their EP speeches online or they see on television the verbal 
belligerence of eurosceptic MEPs. When the subsequent EP election takes place, eurosceptic 
voters are reminded of whether their country’s eurosceptic niche party had bothered to air its 
grievances on the EP floor.  
Hypothesis 4.4:  Total amount of all EP questions posed is positively 
correlated with media hits at the EP party group level. 
Hypothesis 4.5:  Eurosceptic parties, as well as far left parties, will receive 
a disproportionate amount of media coverage and exposure. 
 
This model consists is built upon an assumption that a party choosing to participate, and that 
voters prefer that to a party that does not participate. I test my model quantitatively (Chapters 3 
and 4) in order to observe if EP legislative behavior does, in fact, help to explain why there is a 
group of eurosceptic parties that do not perform as the literature would have them in EP 
elections. 
 
Testing The Theory Statistically 
I quantitatively test my model in several ways in Chapters 3 and 4. In both chapters, I 
adopt a multi-stage approach, which consists of statistically testing hypotheses at each step. 
Because the phenomenon of eurosceptic niche parties underperforming in EP elections goes 
against the consensus that niche and opposition parties will over perform in second-order 
elections the first step in testing my model is to demonstrate that this situation exists in the first 
place. Accordingly, the first step I take in testing my model is to show that Not-Attached 
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eurosceptic parties regularly underperform in EP elections. To achieve this, I test a series of EP 
party group dummies that statistically support my basic hypothesis that not all eurosceptic niche 
parties over perform in EP elections. The unit of analysis is party-year change in vote share, but 
I group all parties in the EP into their respective EP party groups, while controlling for national 
governing status and lagged unemployment rates. 
After showing that there is, indeed, a phenomenon to explain I posit that EP legislative 
behavior is helping to cause this electoral difference between eurosceptic niche parties. I 
hypothesize that outspoken eurosceptics that also join an EP group will be more engaged in EP 
legislative activity than will those eurosceptics that do not join any EP group. I test this 
hypothesis to observe whether there are statistically significant findings showing that Freedom 
and Democracy eurosceptics engage in EP legislative debate more than do Not-Attached 
eurosceptics. I operationalize this hypothesis by introducing a Legislative Exposure Score (LE 
score) that allows the measurement of EP legislative activity by small parties outside of any EP 
pivot position or governing coalition. I calculate LE scores by determining the number of EP 
questions (Q) divided by the number of MEPs a party has (MEP), which I then multiply by their 
attendance rate as decimal (A). By operationalizing LE scores in this fashion I can compare 
across parties regardless of how numerous their presence is in Brussels and Strasbourg. 
LE Score= (Q/MEP) * A 
The higher the LE score, the more involved a party is (at the abstract median MEP-level). I argue 
that eurosceptic niche parties that have elevated LE scores will naturally position themselves in 
advantageous positions to signal to their supporters that they will actively oppose the EU should 
they be supported at the polls. Lastly, I statistically test LE scores’ effects on parties’ change in 
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vote share in order to gauge how much of a direct effect LE scores have on electoral results even 
though I have a relatively low number of observations in which to achieve a correlation.  
 Chapter 3 addresses the situation from both ends of the political process: parties’ 
behavior at the EP and the voters measured by vote share. Obviously, there still remains the 
space in between that will need to be examined and explained. To address the ecological issues 
inherent to any model that looks at party behavior and electoral results, I posit that parties are 
able to signal to their supporters their active opposition to the EU in EP legislative debate via 
traditional and social media outlets. Chapter 4 addresses the space between parties and voters. 
 I group Chapter 4’s hypotheses into two groups in order to explain the link between 
parties’ EP legislative behavior and the media (both social and traditional), and the link between 
the media (both social and traditional) and the public. This requires that each individual link that 
involves the media be analyzed separately from the other. Once both directions of the media 
relationship have been established, the entire relationship is able to be seen. Behavior at the EP 
level is picked up by the media, which in turn is disseminated to the public.  
Few projects have attempted to conduct interviews with extremist voters (see Stockemer 
2015; Stockemer and Amengay 2015). Given the recent political trends in Europe, however, this 
type of party is gaining political ground in many European countries and the EP. As such, the 
parties and elections literature is in need of theoretical alternatives that can help to explain and 
predict extreme right parties and the electoral consequences of their public rhetorical and 
parliamentary grandstanding. I believe that focusing on eurosceptic parties’ parliamentary speech 
and legislative engagement can partially explain this growing phenomenon. 
 On the other hand, by complementing my statistical analyses with  micro-level interview 
data provided by Stockemer (2015) my theory is able to include certain party-specific 
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peculiarities that arise when researching small political parties. In this case, the French FN and 
its activists can be analyzed to provide qualitative insights into a leading eurosceptic party’s 
composition. By partially bridging the gap between quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches, my model provides a more thorough explanation of how ideological extremism 
functions in multiparty systems and second-order elections. My contribution to the literature is 
establishing a theoretical approach and alternative to understanding a growing political influence 
in Europe that is focused on the EP legislative behavior of eurosceptics. 
 
Conclusion 
The value of developing a theory to analyze euroscepticism’s electoral successes or failures in 
EP elections is that it will help to explain a growing phenomenon within Europe, and that it can 
be applied globally where extremist parties seek to gain electoral and political influence. EP 
elections are the ideal testing ground for this theory because it is multiparty and a second-order 
election. This theory allows for the easy typology of Engaged eurosceptic parties to be contrasted 
with non-Engaged eurosceptic parties. Furthermore, it also predicts the electoral outcome that 
such types of hard eurosceptic parties are likely to receive in EP elections depending on their EP 
legislative engagement levels. 
While this dissertation focuses solely on EP elections and euroscepticism, it is also rather 
generalizable. By examining and testing how public grandstanding benefits extreme right parties 
in the EP, this model can be generalized to other multiparty or multi-individual elections such as 
municipal elections or US primary elections wherein voter turnout levels are depressed and the 
electorate becomes more ideologically rigid. Far from a European phenomenon, outspoken 
parliamentary behavior is likely to have the same effect elsewhere in the world. Via social and 
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traditional media, public grandstanding is an activity with a direct link via media outlets to reach 
voters. The higher the level of legislative engagement, the higher the level of media exposure 
that will result from it, which leads to an extremist party reinforcing its message with its party 
loyalists.       
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Chapter III 
The Electoral Benefits of Being Engaged 
 
 Abstract 
Eurosceptic, niche, and opposition parties are predicted to receive electoral gains in second-
order elections such as European Parliament (EP) elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Hix and 
Marsh 2011; Hobolt and Spoon 2012). Eurosceptic parties in particular should have electoral 
advantages in EP elections due to their dual roles as opposition parties domestically and anti-
European Union (EU) parties within Europe (Hobolt and Wittrock 2011). In other words, 
eurosceptic parties ought to see higher vote shares in EP elections than in national elections. 
Those parties affiliated with the Not-Attached EP group, however, do not follow the expected 
pattern. I argue that an anti-EU ideological position alone is not sufficient for a party to achieve 
its second-order electoral boost. Eurosceptic parties must make it known loudly and publicly that 
they are not simply eurosceptic, but that they are fighting the EU at every turn. By actively 
engaging the very institution they oppose, eurosceptic parties demonstrate to voters that they will 
act on the political rhetoric they display. My findings suggest that it is necessary to participate 
actively in order for eurosceptic parties to realize routinely their second-order election boost. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, niche and opposition parties are supposed to fare better in 
second-order elections (see Reif and Schmitt 1980; Hix and Marsh 2011; Hobolt & Spoon 2012), 
and eurosceptic parties are commonly both niche and part of the opposition. As second order 
elections, European Parliamentary (EP) elections, ought to be electoral successes for opposition 
political parties in general and Eurosceptic parties in particular. This is not true, however, for all 
eurosceptic parties, such as the French Front National (FN) or the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (FPO). The question then becomes why do some eurosceptic parties massively over 
perform while others underperform? 
In this chapter, I take the eurosceptic parties that underperform in EP elections that I 
identified in chapter 2, and I compare these parties with eurosceptic parties that realize their 
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expected second-order electoral boost. While no one doubts Jean-Marie Le Pen’s eurosceptic 
ideology, UKIP’s Nigel Farage is more public about his disdain for the EU while in Strasbourg. 
Yet, no quantitative work has tested this difference in legislative behavior on electoral results. 
How, then, do a handful of eurosceptic parties go about in failing to take full advantage of their 
electoral position as both niche and opposition? As the evidence shows, the type of behavior that 
a eurosceptic party displays while in the EP can help to explain this. Grandstanding leads to 
higher levels of public exposure, and subsequently higher levels of public exposure lead to 
higher vote shares in EP elections. In other words, simply being a eurosceptic niche party is not 
sufficient to realize second-order election boosts. While they may be vocal domestically, and 
their ideological position on the EU known, they do not mobilize their supporters or convey the 
importance of voting in EP elections in the way that actively engaged eurosceptic parties do by 
publicly grandstanding against the European Union (EU) within the EU’s only democratic body, 
the EP. As was outlined in the previous chapter, there appears to be a clear distinction between 
eurosceptic parties that are active and over perform electorally, and those eurosceptic parties that 
are not active within the EP and have routinely underperformed electorally.  
 This chapter is divided into the following sections. First, I will introduce my hypotheses 
and include a brief overview of where the literature stands on EP groups, their parties, and the 
importance of legislative participation. Second, the data and methods that are used for this 
chapter’s statistical testing will be further explained. Third, the results from the hypothesis tests 
will be discussed. Lastly, an in-depth discussion about why these findings matter and what they 
mean for euroscpetic parties will follow that will set forth the context in which Chapter 4 will 
address the ecological issues arising with this study.  
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Hypotheses 
 
To summarize my theory and model from chapter 2, the EP is a supranational political institution 
with well over 700 Members of the EP (MEPs). EP elections are considered to be second-order 
elections, and even though the EP has had direct elections of MEPs for over 30 years, there still 
has not been an emergence of any truly pan-European Union (EU) political parties. To overcome 
the inherent problems of a parliament divided not only by ideology, but also along linguistic and 
national cleavages, an EP party group system emerged that allowed for likeminded political 
parties to organize themselves (see Kreppel 2002). As such, German Social Democrats and 
French Socialists place themselves within the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 
EP party group. While there is still no EU Socialist political party standing for EP elections 
across the EU, referring to EP party group would appear to be an appropriate heuristic for 
combining ideologically similar parties for a cross-national analysis. Of particular importance, 
by starting at the EP group level I am able to compare the two groups of eurosceptics of interest 
to observe if statistically significant findings can be had for the Not-Attached and the Freedom 
and Democracy EP groups.
 4
 
 Building on the findings of previous work that showed that in most cases MEPs vote 
according to their ideological position rather than their nationality (Hix et al. 2006), it is logical 
to extend this approach and to posit that EP party groups can be analyzed as cohesive groups 
across nationalities. Moreover, I expect to see similar electoral outcomes for parties within the 
same EP group when other factors are controlled. Because parties that are found on the 
ideological extremes are rarely in governing coalitions domestically
5
, I posit that there should be 
                                                          
4
 In the sense that the Not-Attached EP group represents a de facto EP group even if it is by definition a non EP 
group. 
5
 Therefore, there should be no governing effect on these types of parties because they are rarely ever part of  a 
governing coalition. 
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clear electoral differences in terms of over performing or underperforming in EP elections 
between these EP party groups that share similar eurosceptic ideologies and that are rarely if ever 
part of a ruling coalition domestically. 
 
Hypothesis 3.1 A: Parties within the eurosceptic Not-Attached EP group will not                         
realize the second-order election boost. 
 
Hypothesis 3.1B:  The eurosceptic Freedom and Democracy EP group parties 
will realize a second order election boost.  
 
Hypothesis 3.1C    Not-Attached parties will do less well than other niche-party 
dominated EP groups (EUL/NGL and G/EFA). 
 
Because representative democracy requires politicians to garner the constituents’ support, a 
logical explanation would be that a party’s behavior would have an effect on how energized and 
mobilized its supporters are for an upcoming election. Parties that display clear signals of 
fulfilling their tasks and responsibilities at the parliamentary level would be assumed to be 
sending a stronger message to its supporters that it is worth their time and effort to cast a vote in 
their favor. A vote for their party is a vote for sending an MEP to Brussels and Strasbourg who 
will work on their ideological behalf.     
 How best, though, to capture the legislative behavior of an MEP, and by extension that 
MEP’s political party? Previous work has identified behavioral types of MEPs, and in particular 
several types of eurosceptic MEPs such as The Public Orator, The Pragmatist, or The Absentee 
(Brack 2013). Departing slightly from Brack’s work, I shift the unit of analysis away from the 
individual MEP-level to the EP party group-level under the assumption that it could be a 
behavioral difference that causes there to be different EP party groups when the member parties 
of both Freedom and Democracy and Not-Attached typically share the same eurosceptic 
ideology. 
47 
 
 Of the eurosceptic EP groups, one group will likely demonstrate a more engaged 
approach to the EP. This measurement will differ from other conceptions of legislative activity
6
 
due to the fact that these parties do not number large enough to govern. By demonstrating that 
certain EP groups are clearly more involved in EP activities and debate, however, I will be able 
to distinguish not just between individual MEPs, but between EP groups in the number of 
questions and rate of attendance while in Brussels or Strasbourg.  
 
Hypothesis 3.2: The eurosceptic Freedom and Democracy EP group will be more 
active in the EP than will the eurosceptic Not-Attached EP group. 
 
By largely abstaining from EP legislative debate and scrutiny, eurosceptic MEPs and their parties 
do not reinforce the notion among their loyalists that EP elections are important events. After all, 
if the MEPs themselves do not care enough to attend plenary sessions or to be bothered to submit 
official questions, then why would their supporters be bothered to cast a vote in an election for a 
parliament of which they do not even support the existence? With such a clear qualitative 
distinction between MEPs such as Jean-Marie Le Pen and Nigel Farage, it is not an illogical 
jump to predict that differences in EP behavior would have a tangible effect on a party’s vote 
share. Moreover, any electoral effect ought to be amplified for niche eurosceptic parties that 
already have a cult of personality aspect to them that requires a visible leader, which would 
likely lead to higher levels of electoral volatility. Therefore, I propose a formula, and albeit 
relatively crude, I feel that it is able to capture at least a minimal amount of the legislative 
behavioral difference between ideologically similar eurosceptics. I call this the Legislative 
                                                          
6
 Such as introducing and/or passing legislation, or ministerial positions held. 
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Exposure Score (LE score) because this is the type of open and public legislative behavior that 
can lead to public exposure to voters of what an MEP or party is doing legislatively. 
At this point, I shift the unit of analysis to the national political party-level. By starting at 
the aggregated EP party group-level for the first four hypotheses, I seek to establish a gradual 
covering of all the relevant bases to demonstrate the effect that legislative behavior has on 
electoral results. I introduce LE scores to show the difference in EP engagement between the 
various eurosceptic parties. I calculate LE scores by determining the number of EP questions (Q) 
divided by the number of MEPs a party has (MEP), which I then multiply by their attendance 
rate as decimal (A). By operationalizing LE scores in this fashion I can compare across parties 
regardless of how numerous their presence is in Brussels and Strasbourg. 
Legislative Exposure Score= (Q/MEP) * A 
Clearly, this formula is not able to capture other EU and EP behavior that would increase an 
MEP’s public exposure such as organizing a protest march in Brussels or taking to Twitter, 
Facebook, or Youtube to vent frustration. It is merely a rudimentary first step in quantifying the 
behavior of a still relatively small number of eurosceptic MEPs. 
 
Hypothesis 3.3 A:  Eurosceptic parties Legislative Exposure Score will be 
positively correlated with electoral performance in EP elections. 
 
Lastly, it is important to test how important an LE score is to a party’s electoral outcome in EP 
elections. Is it sufficient to have a higher than median LE score in order to over perform in EP 
elections? Or is it necessary to have a higher than median LE score in order to over perform in 
EP elections, but there must be several other components present for it to occur? Does ideology 
play a crucial role? Green party supporters are already primed to view EP elections as important 
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political events, but eurosceptics are routinely told by their party leaders that the EU is 
detrimental to their national identity and well-being. It would be logical, therefore, for an LE 
score to be more consequential to a eurosceptic party that must funambulate the tightrope of 
disparaging the very institution to which it hopes to win seats. 
 I adopt a behavioral understanding of parties, voters, and elections. Naturally, external 
shocks to the system such as the late 2000s recession or the mid 2015 wave of refugees will have 
an effect on party support; particularly for those niche parties that are found in the opposition and 
that have cultural threat as a centerpiece of their party’s platform. Still, voters need 
reinforcement that those they send to a parliament of any kind will show up to work and do the 
job they promised in the run-up to the election. Active participation of a party’s MEPs in the EP 
legislative process would signal to voters that this is a party worth supporting even within the 
context of not supporting the parliament to which they are sending that party’s MEPs. In short, 
how does a party get its supporters to cast votes in an election that they do not believe should 
exist in the first place?  I answer that by saying that they can achieve this by publically 
demonstrating that they are fighting the monster from within the monster’s own lair. 
 
Hypothesis 3.3 B: An elevated Legislative Exposure Score is a necessary 
condition for a eurosceptic party to over perform in EP elections. 
 
These six hypotheses should be read, generally, to be sequential in nature. Because I am 
attempting to demonstrate quantitatively that there are systematic differences between 
eurosceptic parties, I need to address this phenomenon from a multilevel perspective. In order to 
dispel the notion that the effects are driving solely by one national party, I start at the EP group 
level so that I can aggregate handfuls of likeminded parties. Subsequently, I then disaggregate 
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the EP party groups to the party-level to show a more direct correlation between actual party 
behavior and its electoral outcomes. By adopting a multilevel approach, I am able to demonstrate 
that legislative behavior has an electoral effect, and that it is not confined or driven only by one 
party’s exceptional behavior and electoral outcomes. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
The data used for testing this chapter’s hypotheses all originate from official government 
sources. In some instances, I use data collected from official government sources that have been 
collected by a third party such as Parlgov’s (Döring and Manow 2016) elections datasets. For 
other data, namely economic indicators or governing status dummies, I collect these from official 
government sources directly or code them in accordance to which party is in government 
coalition or opposition, respectively. No data used in this chapter is subjective in nature, and the 
ideological scores used are Parlgov’s composite that combine several ideological placement 
projects in order not to become too exposed to any researcher bias. 
The dependent variable for all hypotheses other than H 3.2 is a party’s over or 
underperformance in EP elections, and I look at all EP elections from 1984-2014. The unit of 
analysis is party over or under performance of vote share for each EP election, though not all 
parties are included in every EP election. In order to calculate over or underperformance, a party 
must have contested a previous national parliamentary election and a subsequent EP election. 
Furthermore, if a party has not previously won any seats in the EP, they are dropped until they 
do. I do this because I need to know which EP party group they join in order to start to 
differentiate between how parties behave legislatively once they arrive in Brussels. Therefore, in 
combination with both requirements, parties must have contested previous national 
parliamentary elections, a subsequent EP election, and have won at least one EP seat in the prior 
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EP election before I include them in my statistical testing. This is why the dataset starts with the 
1984 EP election rather than with the 1979 one. 
 The electoral data used to calculate the dependent variable come from Parlgov (2016), 
which itself sources its data from each EU member state’s official election results. I calculate 
over or under performance in EP elections by subtracting the previous national parliamentary 
election vote share from that party’s subsequent EP election vote share. For example, because the 
French Front National (FN) received an 11.1% vote share in the 2002 French parliamentary 
election and a 9.8% vote share in the 2004 EP election, I subtract 11.1 from 9.8 to result in a 
change in vote share of -1.3. This would be an underperformance. Conversely, the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) had a 1.5% vote share in the 2001 UK General Elections 
and a 16.2% vote share in the 2004 EP elections to give them a change in vote share of 14.7. In 
this case, this would be an over performance. I calculate the change in vote share with the EP 
election minus domestic election so that it is more intuitive of whether a certain party performed 
better or worse in the EP election. A positive change in vote share reflects over performance, 
while a negative change in vote share reflects an underperformance.  
For economic controls, I use both Eurostat (2016) and the OECD (2013) to provide data 
on unemployment rates. According to best practices, I use a six-month lagged unemployment 
rate at the national level (Pacek 1994; Roberts 2008). Most EU member states employ regional 
districts for both domestic parliamentary and EP elections, but because these boundaries are 
oftentimes not the same for both elections I choose operationalize unemployment by taking the 
national unemployment rate to keep the unit of analysis consistent across variables.  
I control for governmental factors in order to isolate the effect of EP party group 
membership from outside influences deriving from governing or opposition-status effects. I 
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operationalize this by including dummies to capture whether a party is a governing power, a 
minor coalition partner, or in the opposition. I characterize governing power to be if a particular 
party has the head of government position. In the case of co-habitation, I define the governing 
party as the one that holds the Prime Ministership. In my models, I use the governing power 
dummy as my baseline. 
I control for party ideological position using Parlgov’s left-right, 1-10 scale that is a 
composite of expert survey data (Döring and Manow 2016). Again, I include this control in order 
to isolate as much as is possible the effect of simply being a member of any certain EP group. 
Additionally, since eurosceptics are typically from niche parties, it is useful to compare the far 
right to the far left in order to observe if the same legislative behavior is having the same 
electoral effect when exhibited by other niche party MEPs. 
For H3.2, I use a data set that includes EP questions during the 2004-2009 EP session, 
and I sort out the raw number of questions each MEP and party pose. I take the total number of 
questions each party asks, and I divide them by the number of MEPs each party has in the EP. 
This approach allows for me to reach a mean number of EP questions per party MEP, which I 
use as an abstract notion of how active each party is at the EP when controlled for their 
delegation size. I calculate political party attendance rates by taking the attendance record of all 
of a party’s MEPs at plenary sessions during the EP session. I then find the mean, which is used 
for the party as a whole. I use attendance data from Vote Watch (2014) to calculate each party’s 
mean attendance rate. I label this index the Legislative Exposure Score. 
The dependent variable for H3.2 is a party’s EP engagement level as measured by the 
indicators in the aforementioned paragraph. EP questions are the clearest and most visible way of 
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participating, while attending plenary sessions would capture a more passive for of EP 
participation. For this hypothesis, I combine both forms of engagement. 
Researching eurosceptics, and in particular non-mainstream eurosceptics, restricts the 
number of observations available. In addition, because EP elections only occur every five years 
and parties must meet several criteria before they can be included into my data set, I must be 
content with a relatively small N-size. For statistical analysis, I employ a Time-Series regression 
model.
7
 
I start by including some general descriptive statistics, which I break down into EP party 
groups. Once I have shown that there are clear differences in mean over or underperformance 
between the various EP party groups, I statistically test my hypotheses using several models that 
all use OLS regression. I do not include any clustering of standard errors or country dummies 
because I am intending to show that there is a phenomenon across the EU for eurosceptics who 
participate versus those who choose not to do so.  
 
 Findings 
Clear differences are apparent between EP groups. These findings are the aggregates of all the 
parties within each EP group over time. While some of these EP group names have changed over 
the years, I use the 2004-2009 names in order to provide consistency across time. Even though 
these findings are still at the EP party group level, they indicate that there is likely to be distinct 
electoral differences between parties that affiliate themselves with various EP groups. 
                                                          
7
 For robustness checks, I also run my models as pooled cross-sectional, which results in slightly weaker findings, 
but coefficient signs stay in the same direction and remain statistically significant at the .05 level (see Appendix 
Table 1). I do not use panel corrected standard errors, since my data are not panel data. I do not cluster standard 
errors by country because previous research has shown that ideologically similar parties have more in common 
across EU member states than they do with other parties from their home country. I also do not cluster standard 
errors by EP group because EP group dummy variables are used as my causal variables in the time-series model. 
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Table 3.1 provides descriptive differences between EP groups by their mean change in 
vote share. As can be seen in this table, eurosceptic EP Groups generally perform better in EP 
elections than they do in domestic ones, but there is an obvious outlier to this trend. The Not-
Attached parties underperform in EP elections by nearly a full percentage point. It is worth 
noting that these descriptive findings cannot be the result of just one or two Not-Attached 
eurosceptic parties that routinely under perform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.1: EP Electoral Performance by EP Group 
 
Additionally, in order to observe the extent to which Not-Attached parties underperform in EP 
elections, I compare their mean change in vote share to that of both other eurosceptic EP groups 
and EP groups dominated by niche parties. The eurosceptic Freedom and Democracy group has a 
mean over performance of 3.48 percentage points in EP elections, while the softer and 
mainstream eurosceptics in the Conservatives and Reformists group over perform by .41 
percentage points.  
 The most similar group of eurosceptics to the Not-Attached parties is the Freedom and 
Democracy group. As such, a comparison between these two EP groups highlights the 
unpredicted underperformance of Not-Attached parties such as the FN, FPO, or Jobbiks. If 
EP Groups Mean Change in 
 Vote Share 
# of Observations 
   
Not Attached -.86 21 
Freedom/Democracy 3.48 12 
Conservatives/Reform  .41 17 
Nordic Greens .96 36 
Group Greens 2.20 54 
Liberals/Democrats -1.87 83 
Christian Dems (People’s) -.01 137 
Social Dems  -3.82 121 
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Freedom and Democracy parties are able to realize substantial over performance in EP elections, 
why are the Not-Attached parties unable to do so? Descriptive statistics allow us to show that a 
phenomenon is occurring, but they cannot tell us why it is occurring.  
An additional aspect of note here is that some of the Conservatives and Reformists group 
parties had been in the national opposition during much of 1990s and 2000s, which accounts for 
their positive change in vote share even though they are mainstream eurosceptics. The Tories, for 
example, over performed during the Tony Blair years; just not to the same extent as UKIP has 
over the last 15 years.  
 Not-Attached parties can be compared to other parties on two general dimensions: their 
euroscepticism and their status as niche parties. Descriptively, Not-Attached parties demonstrate 
a peculiar underperformance in EP elections, particularly when compared to other eurosceptics. 
This logically leads one to question what is causing this difference between ideologically similar 
parties. The second dimension also warrants attention because there is predicted to be shared 
electoral over performance outcomes for niche and oppositional parties. Opposition party over 
performance leads to ambiguous findings due to domestic shifts between center-right and center-
left governing parties, which results in mean changes in vote share washing out over the long 
term.
8
 Yet, it is predicted that niche parties on both the right and left will realize similar second-
order election boosts. Here again, however, the Not-Attached parties do not realize the second-
order election boosts that parties in the Group Greens
9
 and Nordic Greens
10
 do. 
Group Greens and the Nordic Greens both benefit from their second-order status in EP 
elections. Parties within the Group Greens see a mean change in vote share of 2.35 percentage 
                                                          
8
 See Christian Democrats mean change in vote share being -.01 over 137 EP election results, and with stronger 
center-right  electoral outcomes more recently one would expect the center-left to start over performing in EP 
elections as the domestic oppositional party. 
9
 Group Greens are the environmental Greens. 
10
 Nordic Greens are comprised of hard left parties. 
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points in EP elections, while the Nordic Green parties have a mean change in vote share of .88 
percentage points. Parties within both of these EP groups ideologically located on the left over 
perform in EP elections, which is to be expected. What is unexpected, though, is how glaring the 
underperformance of Not-Attached parties is when viewed against not only other eurosceptics, 
but against other niche parties as well. By including leftist and eurosceptic niche parties, it 
becomes apparent that the phenomenon of parties such as the FN, FPO, Jobbik, or BNP
11
 
underperforming occurs regardless that they are both niche and opposition parties. 
 Descriptively, there is support for H3.1 A, B, and C because the Non-Attached group is 
the only EP group that is comprised of niche parties, but does not generally over perform in EP 
elections. By starting with simple descriptive statististics, I try to construct a solid foundation 
upon which to answer what I believe is the most fundamental question posed in this dissertation: 
why does this happen?  Before providing an explanation for this phenomenon, I need to see if 
this routine underperformance by Not-Attached eurosceptics that I predict actually exists in the 
first place.  
Next is to show that these differences are statistically significant, and that they support 
the notion that a certain type of eurosceptic party exhibits a type of behavior that results in them 
managing to squander two electoral advantages
12
 that should be working in their advantage. In 
Table 3.2, I present three regression models that each support the claim that there is something 
different about Not-Attached parties other than their inability to form an EP group. 
 In Model 1 of Table 3.2, I test all the EP groups except for the Social Democrats and 
                                                          
11
 British National Party. 
12
 The two dimensions are: being eurosceptic (able to take protest votes away from center-right parties) and being 
a niche party. 
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Christian Democrats on change in vote share
13
. I choose to leave out the two largest EP groups to 
demonstrate the effect that simply being in a certain EP group has on change in vote share when 
only the smaller EP groups are included. I control for economic conditions with a six-month 
lagged unemployment rate, and for governing status using opposition-status and minor coalition 
partner-status dummies. Lastly, I control for any ideological variation with a left-right 
ideological score.   
In Model 2 of Table 3.2, I test the Not-Attached EP group and the centrist EP groups on 
change in vote share.
14
 Again, I control for economic conditions with a six-month lagged 
unemployment rate, governing status as either in the opposition or a minor coalition partner 
using dummies, and ideological position using a left-right ideological scale.  
For Model 3 of Table 3.2, I include only the Not-Attached EP group.
15
 I do this to see 
what the simple effect of being a Not-Attached party has on vote share while still controlling for 
economic conditions with a six-month lagged unemployment rate variable, the governing effects 
of being in the opposition or a minor coalition partner, and ideological position using a left-right 
ideological scale.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Model 1: ∆Vote Share=α+β(NotAttached)+β(EuropeFreedom)+β(ConReforms)+β(NordicGreens)+ 
β(GroupGreens)+β(LibDems)+β(Unemployment)+β(OppositionStatus)+β(MinorCoalitionStatus) + β(Left-Right)+ε 
14 Model 2 : ∆VoteShare=α+β(NotAttached)+β(LiberalDems)+β(SocialDems)+β(ChristianDems)+ β(Unemployment)+ 
β(OppositionStatus)+β(MinorCoalitionStatus)+β(left_rightposition)+ε 
15
 Model 3 : ∆VoteShare=α+β(NotAttached)+β(Unemployment)+β(Oppositionstatus)+ 
β(MinorCoalitionStatus+β(left_rightposition)+ε 
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Determinants of  
∆ Vote Share 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Not Attached -3.65** 
(1.46) 
-4.74*** 
(1.62) 
-3.25** 
(1.41) 
Europe of Freedom and Democracy 2.44 
(1.56) 
  
European Conservatives and Reformists 1.62 
(1.67) 
  
European Left-Nordic Green 3.14** 
(1.29) 
  
Greens-European Free Alliance 4.14**** 
(1.03) 
  
Alliance of Liberals -1.32* 
(.79) 
-3.49**** 
(.97) 
 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists  -3.82**** 
(.79) 
 
European People’s Party  -1.25 
(.94) 
 
Controls    
Unemployment -.05 
(.07) 
-.06 
(.07) 
-.03 
(.07) 
Opposition Status 6.60**** 
(.75) 
6.63**** 
(.74) 
7.54**** 
(.72) 
Minor Coalition Partner 5.39**** 
(.86) 
5.32**** 
(.85) 
5.41**** 
(.86) 
Left-Right Ideology Scale .81**** 
(.19) 
.38** 
(.18) 
.41*** 
(.14) 
constant -10.01**** 
(1.28) 
-5.15**** 
(1.26) 
-8.03*** 
(1.13) 
    
N 544 544 544 
R
2
 .21 .22 .17 
P>Chi
2 
 .0000 .0000 .0000 
*(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01), ****(p<0.001)    
Table 3.2: Times-Series Regression Analysis of EP Party Group Effect on DV 
 
 
In all three models, the Not-Attached dummy has negative coefficients that are statistically 
significant. Particularly when viewed in conjunction with other niche party EP groups, it 
becomes clear that this particular type of euroscepticism is not resulting in the predicted over 
performance in EP elections that the literature would predict. As such, it appears that there is 
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sufficient empirical evidence that there is, in fact, a clear difference between the different types 
of eurosceptics. This statistically significant evidence supports Hypotheses 3.1A, B, and C, 
which posited that Not-Attached eurosceptics will not realize the second-order election boosts 
that Freedom and Democracy eurosceptic parties will. Furthermore, the Not-Attached parties 
also prove to be the only niche EP group that does not routinely receive a second-order election 
boost, which is observed when they are compared to Greens and Nordic Green EP group parties.  
 
How Legislative Behavior Happens 
 
For hypothesis 3.2, I introduce a possible explanation for why a eurosceptic party may 
underperform in an election in which it should be massively over performing. Due to the limited 
number of EP elections and data available, my model for this chapter relies solely on the 6
th
 EP 
session, which ran from 2004 to 2009.  
 I posit that there are electoral benefits to EP legislative behavior, and I operationalize this 
claim based on EP questions and attendance rates at plenary sessions. Activities outside of these 
two areas are difficult to quantify, and data reliability becomes a major issue. Nonetheless, there 
are clear differences in the number of EP questions that each EP party group poses. In Figure 1, 
each EP party group is separated out, and the number of EP questions that were posed by 
member parties is depicted. Bear in mind that I have calculated these questions on a per-MEP 
basis, since the total number of MEPs varies widely between EP party groups. For example, the 
Not-Attached EP party group poses just over 140 total questions per Not-attached MEP. 
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Figure 3.1: Number of EP Questions Posed by EP Group 
 
 
As is indicated in the figure, the blue amount represents the number of written questions per 
MEP. The red portion represents the number of oral questions posed per MEP, and the green 
section at the top shows the number of questions posed per MEP during Question Time. 
Immediately, the Not-Attached appear to be the more active EP participants compared to the 
Freedom and Democracy EP party group. Upon closer inspection, however, Not-Attached parties 
barely ever pose any oral questions or questions during Question Time, which highlights the 
notion that these parties do not participate in the EP activities that require attendance at the rate 
of any of the other EP party groups. Chapter 4 delves into the differences between the types of 
questions more thoroughly than I do here in the chapter 3, but it worth noting that there is a 
difference in behavior between the Not-Attached parties and the Freedom and Democracy parties 
in terms of EP questions. In conjunction with hypotheses 3.1 A and B, there is mounting 
evidence that the distinction between eurosceptics is more than just electoral in nature. 
 To illustrate further the differences between eurosceptics, and between other EP party 
groups, Figure 3.2 shows the mean LE score for each EP party group. I argue that a possible 
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explanation for why certain eurosceptics do not over perform is that they do not participate in the 
EP as much as do the eurosceptics who do consistently over perform. In Figure 3.2, I calculate 
mean LE scores for each EP party group, and there is a noticeable difference between the Not-
Attached and the Freedom and Democracy EP groups.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: LE Score by EP Group 
 
Further supporting H 3.2, LE scores take into account each party’s number of MEPs, and they 
combine EP questions and attendance rates. Ergo, it is safe to compare each EP party group’s 
mean LE score across groups regardless of how many MEPs happen to be members of any 
specific EP party group. The Freedom and Democracy group’s mean LE score is quadruple that 
of the Not-Attached. While the Not-Attached parties may pose a higher number of written EP 
questions per MEP than the Freedom and Democracy parties, they do not attend plenary sessions 
at nearly the frequency of the Freedom and Democracy MEPs. They appear to be phoning it in 
rather than participating in EP debate. Attendance matters, and because I have already shown 
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that Not-Attached parties routinely underperform in EP elections, this captures a difference 
between similarly-placed ideological eurosceptics.  
 The next step in testing Hypothesis 3.2 is to include a dependent variable in order to 
observe whether the differences between EP party groups is a possible explanation for why the 
Not-Attached regularly fail to achieve their second-order election boosts. In table 3, a correlation 
matrix is used to see if LE scores are positively correlated with EP groups that have been known 
to be loud and obnoxious within the EP. If there is a positive correlation with these EP groups, 
then LE scores are measuring what they are intended to be measuring, which is how much 
exposure a party can potentially receive from their legislative behavior.  
            Overall, LE scores are very weakly correlated for most of the niche EP party groups, and 
are essentially not correlated for the mainstream EP party groups. There is still, however, some 
value to be had in Table 3.3. The highlighted LE score correlations show positive, though very 
weak, correlations for the two loudest and typically most disruptive EP party groups: Freedom 
and Democracy and the Nordic Greens. Of note here is that this captures only the 6
th
 EP session 
from 2004 to 2009.  
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 Left-Right Score Legislative  
Exposure Score 
EP Attendance 
Rate 
Number of EP 
Questions Posed 
Left-Right Score 1.0000    
Party MEP Public 
Exposure Score 
-0.0722 1.0000   
EP Attendance 
Rate 
-0.1239 0.0925 1.0000  
Number of EP 
Questions Posed 
0.1516 0.3485 -0.2014 1.0000 
Not Attached 
Group 
0.4139 -0.0159 -0.2775 -0.0544 
Europe of 
Freedom Group 
0.3239 0.1390 -0.2511 0.1985 
Conservative 
Reformers Group 
0.2451 -0.0834 -0.0889 0.0701 
Nordic Greens 
Group 
-0.5066 0.2288 -0.1967 -0.0438 
Group Greens  -0.4067 -0.0262 -0.1573 -0.1773 
Alliance of 
Liberals and 
Democrats 
0.2199 -0.0943 0.0929 -0.0955 
European 
People’s Group 
0.3300 -0.1328 0.2270 0.0629 
Alliance of 
Socialists and 
Democrats 
-0.3008 0.0141 0.0599 0.0574 
N=64 Table 3.3:Correlation Matrix of EP Activity and EP Party Group 
 
While a strongly positive correlation for the loudest EP party groups would have been optimal, 
Table 3 contributes additional evidence of the differences in legislative behavior between 
eurosceptic EP party groups. The final step of testing Hypothesis 3.2, which states that LE scores 
will be positively correlated with change in vote share, is to include the dependent variable. In 
Figures 3.3 through 3.6, I compare scatter plots for each of the niche EP party groups, though, of 
course, the emphasis is on the differences between the eurosceptic Not-Attached and Freedom 
and Democracy EP party groups. 
In Figures 3.3 and 3.4, I compare Freedom and Democracy parties and Not-Attached 
parties. LE scores are from 2004-2009, and the change in vote share is from the 2009 EP 
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election. While LE scores were not strongly correlated in the correlation matrix, by using a 
descriptive scatter plot it is noted that no Freedom and Democracy parties underperformed in the 
2009 EP election. The inverse is true for the Not-Attached parties of whom none over performed 
in the 2009 EP election.   
 
                         Figure 3.3: Two-Way Plot    Figure 3.4:Two-Way Plot 
 
 
Moreover, all of the Freedom and Democracy parties had scores higher than the cluster of the All 
Other Parties. Meanwhile, two out of the three Not-Attached eurosceptic parties had LE scores 
that would place them within the cluster of the All Other Parties. 
 I include scatter plots of the Nordic Greens and the Greens in Figures 4 and 5 in order to 
capture any phenomenon that might exist across niche EP party groups. For these parties there is 
no obvious connection between over performing in EP elections and elevated LE scores. While 
the Nordic Greens are clearly more vocal and make their presence known more than do the 
environmentally-minded Greens, they do not appear to gain any electoral advantage by doing so. 
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  Figure 3.5:Two-Way Plot    Figure 3.6: Two-Way Plot 
 
When the leftist EP party groups are contrasted with the right-wing eurosceptic groups, there 
appears to be an ideological component at play, as well. Freedom and Democracy parties have 
higher LE scores than do the Nordic Green parties, but the Communists are the second loudest 
EP group, and they did not benefit from this during the 2009 EP election like the Freedom and 
Democracy parties did.  
 Hypotheses 3.1A, B, and C are all supported by the evidence. Not-Attached parties do 
worse in EP elections than do the Freedom and Democracy parties. Not-Attached parties are also 
less frequently involved in EP legislative activities than Freedom and Democracy parties as seen 
with their much lower mean LE scores. Thus, there is ample empirical support for all 3.1 
hypotheses. 
 For Hypothesis 3.2, the results confirm that there is a difference in EP legislative 
behavior between the EP groups. Furthermore, this is a possible explanation for the difference 
between underperforming and over performing eurosceptics. I find evidence that indicates that 
an elevated LE score results in over performance by all Freedom and Democracy parties, and a 
lower LE score results in under performance by most of the Not-Attached parties.  
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Hypothesis 3.3A is supported in that LE scores are weakly, but positively correlated to 
positive changes in vote share for eurosceptic parties. However, the Not-Attached Vlaams Blok 
managed to have an elevated LE score (176.7) while under performing by 2.15 percentage points 
in the 2009 EP election.  
Lastly, there is strong support for Hypothesis 3.3B. While it cannot be said that an 
elevated LE score is sufficient for over performing in the 2009 EP elections, it can be said that it 
was necessary to have an elevated LE score to over perform in the 2009 EP elections for 
eurosceptic parties. 
 
Discussion 
 
Looking beyond the 2009 EP elections, a handful of parties tend to be driving the Not-Attached 
group’s under performance: the FPO, the FN, and the Jobbiks. To a lesser extent, historically the 
Vlaams Blok and the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid also have underperformed, but not to the 
same extent as the former parties. The FPO underperformed in the 2004 and 2009 EP elections 
by an average of 4.28 percentage points, while the FN underperformed by 2.97 percentage points 
over the time period 1986 to 2009. It is worth noting that in general these parties are not included 
in governments, but in the FPO’s case this was actually a party in a governing coalition from 
2000 to 2003. The Jobbik party appears to be following the path of the FPO and FN, but because 
Hungary only joined the EU in 2004 they have not had the same effect of pulling down the Not-
Attached party group’s change in vote share to the extent that the FPO and FN have had. They 
do, however, fit the FPO and FN mold very well, and it would be expected that they will 
continue to underperform rather badly in future EP elections. 
In addition to the Vlaams Blok and Partij voor de Vrijheid, there are Eastern European 
eurosceptics that could be heading in the same direction of minor underperformers. Solidarna 
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Polska and Partidul Romania Mare are in a state of transition, and unlike the Jobbiks, these 
eurosceptics could mold themselves after UKIP rather than the Not-Attached eurosceptics. Time 
will tell how these parties behave and evolve.  
 Interestingly, neither the FN nor the FPO were originally anti-EU (Topaloff 2012). Their 
populism, however, led them to take harder stances against Brussels over the years. Whether 
these were strategic decisions at the outset taken in order to establish political policy space where 
available (Hug 2001), the behavior of voters to partake in compensatory voting (Kedar 2009), or 
the idea that they would benefit from adopting a hard anti-EU position and subsequently not 
waver from that position (Adams et al. 2006) is difficult to ascertain. Logically, though, if they 
intentionally constructed a more anti-EU party platform to tap into EU voter malaise, then they 
would be capable of re-establishing themselves as more vocal opponents of the EU in the EP. In 
fact, a case-study on the FN under the leadership of Marine Le Pen suggests that they have done 
just that leading up to the 2014 EP election. 
 Public opinion is intrinsically linked to any study of euroscpeticism. The EU has had 
notoriously low approval ratings in the UK, and in Austria only 37% declared the EU to be “a 
good thing” in 2008, which contrasts with the EU-wide average of 53% (Fallend 2008). It seems 
like the FPO is clearly deficient in maximizing its anti-EU ideology in the way that UKIP is able 
to do so. As voter antipathy toward the EU passes an abstract threshold, eurosceptic parties must 
become even more public in their anti-EU legislative behavior to capture their supporters’ votes. 
At some point, if eurosceptic voters’ disdain for the EU becomes so ingrained that they do not 
even bother to vote in EP elections, then eurosceptic parties such as the FPO or FN will be 
forced to either accept a lower EP vote share than what would be predicted for them, or change 
their behavior and signal to their party loyalists that they will actively combat the EU from 
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within. These underperforming eurosceptics need to position themselves in political spaces to 
capture the anti-EU vote that the electorate is perceiving as being ignored by their country’s 
mainstream parties (Adams et al. 2006; Hobolt et al. 2008; Maier et al. 2012). Similar to Green 
parties that maximize their vote share by emphasizing their bona fides to those voters who are 
weary of some of the environmental policies of the mainstream parties (Hix and Marsh 2007; 
Hobolt and Spoon 2012), Not-Attached eurosceptics must tap into what center-right mainstream 
parties are perceived to be ignoring. Sincere voting is not a phenomenon of solely the left. 
Accordingly, anti-EU parties could recognize this electoral opportunity to siphon off voters from 
mainstream parties, and they would do so via sending cues and signals to let voters know that 
their party elites strongly will oppose Brussels if elected (Hooghe 2007). 
 
Conclusion  
 
Subsequent chapters will expand upon the findings introduced in this chapter. One of the more 
problematic aspects for this chapter is the lack of total EP elections and the relatively short EP 
tenure for many Eastern European parties. Not much can be done to remedy this in the short-
term, but in the years to come future studies will be able to revisit the issue of why some 
eurosceptics fail to perform as what would be predicted of them. For this reason, there are two 
general suggestions for future replication of this chapter’s models. 
 First, with each new election cycle, both domestic elections and EP ones, there will be 
dozens of additional observations by which to analyze how certain parties perform both in their 
domestic first-order elections and in EP ones. It is not only more elections that will add to the 
data set, though, because a handful of parties are just now starting to contest elections 
independently of their former party from which they splintered due to policy differences. 
Solidarna Polska, for instance, split from the mainstream anti-EU party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 
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after the 2009 EP elections. It remains to be seen if they will continue to be a stand-alone party, 
and if so, how effective they will be in Polish and EP elections. With the luxury of future EP 
election results, we will be able more accurately to test this chapter’s hypotheses with the 
additional data. 
 Second, as more research is conducted on euroscepticism the literature continuously 
grows. While macro data, like what are used in the this chapter, show the two ends of the party-
election relationship, micro data can complement the research literature by uncovering how 
eurosceptic parties make internal decisions. If, for example, Marine Le Pen has explicitly 
recommended a new legislative approach to the EP, then we can say that the FN is consciously 
adopting new strategies. This type of research helps to overcome the ecological issues that arise 
when doing macro data research. But again, time is able to fix much of this as more and more 
researchers focus their attention on eurosceptic parties and the EP.  
 Still, this chapter’s hypotheses are generally supported. In Table 3.4, I provide a 
summary of support for each of the hypotheses. In cases where there is only partial support for a 
hypothesis, I provide an explanation for the cases in which the hypothesis did not hold. 
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Hypothesis Predicted 
Outcome 
Actual 
Outcome 
Explanation 
H 3.1A: Parties within the eurosceptic 
Not-Attached EP group will not realize 
the second-order election boost.  
 
 
+ 
 
Supported 
Not Attached Eurosceptics 
under performed in 16 out of 
22 EP elections. 
H3.1B:  The eurosceptic Freedom and 
Democracy EP group parties will realize 
a second order election boost.  
 
 
+ 
 
Supported 
These Eurosceptic parties over 
performed in 9 out of 11 EP 
elections. 
H3.1C:  Not-Attached parties will do 
less well than other niche-party 
dominated EP groups (Nordic Greens 
and Greens). 
 
 
+ 
 
Supported 
 Both EP Party Groups, Nordic 
Greens and Greens, generally 
over perform in EP elections. 
Not-Attached Party Group 
does not.  
H3.2: The eurosceptic Freedom and 
Democracy EP group will be more 
active in the EP than will the eurosceptic 
Not-Attached EP group. 
 
 
+ 
 
Supported 
Freedom and Democracy 
parties have, on average, a 
Legislative Exposure score 
that is 4 times greater than 
Not-Attached parties. 
H3.3A:  Eurosceptic parties Legislative 
Exposure Score will be positively 
correlated with electoral performance in 
EP elections. 
 
 
+ 
 
Partially 
Supported 
For some eurosceptic parties 
this was true (UKIP, FN), for 
others this was false (Dutch 
Freedom Party, True Finns). 
H3.3 B: An elevated Legislative 
Exposure Score is a necessary condition 
for a eurosceptic party to over perform 
in EP elections. 
 
 
+ 
 
Partially 
Supported 
Did not hold for all parties. 
Dutch Freedom Party over-
performed with low LE Score, 
Slovak National Party 
underperformed with higher 
LE Score. 
Table 3.4: Hypothesis Summary 
 
In Chapter 4, I attempt to address the ecological issues of this chapter as best I can. I posit that it 
is via the media that engaged eurosceptics are able to signal to their party loyalists that they are 
worth their vote. This includes all forms of media including print, television, and social media. 
Voters are not present in Brussels or Strasbourg to observe how their MEPs behave, but if MEPs 
are able to arouse enough media attention to broadcast what they are doing to combat the EU, or 
even simply being sufficiently obnoxious and disrespectful, their EP legislative behavior lives on 
71 
 
long past the couple of minutes they took to produce it. This chapter covered the bookends of this 
topic, but the next chapter will attempt to explain what transpires in between the two book 
covers. 
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Chapter IV 
The Link between MEPs, the EP, Parties, and Voters 
 
“Mr. Verhofstadt, I know that by heckling you increase your hits on Youtube because otherwise 
nobody in Europe wants to listen to you.” 
     -Nigel Farage, EP debate on 11 March 2015 in Strasbourg. 
 
 
Abstract 
There is an inherent ecological issue that arises out of Chapter 3’s findings. Non-strategic 
eurosceptic parties generally underperform in EP elections, but how are EP voters made aware 
of whether a hard eurosceptic party is engaged within the EP? In this chapter, I show that the 
media, both social and traditional, play the role of the link between parties and voters. There is a 
strong link between how active parties are within the EP and how many media hits they receive. 
There is also a strong link between the media and voters due to the very high levels of media 
consumption that the public has. When combined, the findings of this chapter explain the process 
that leads to the electoral findings in Chapter 3.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
When a eurosceptic Member of the European Parliament (MEP) decides to take the floor in 
Strasbourg and delivers a blistering critique of the EU and the European project as a whole, it is 
more than simply articulating a principled argument. In the modern political arena, public 
speeches can be instantaneously broadcast throughout Europe. Soon after these speeches appear 
on social media sites where they will be viewed millions of times. By engaging in public 
grandstanding, eurosceptic parties are able to reach EP voters in a low-cost, high-reward scenario 
to reinforce public notions that not only will these parties run campaigns opposing EU expansion 
and integration, but they will actively fight the beast from within its own institutions. By creating 
these signals to voters, eurosceptic parties establish an information link between their EP 
legislative behavior and the EP voting public. 
73 
 
 A common issue that arises when researchers have macro-level electoral findings is 
whether there is evidence of the same phenomenon at the micro-level. The ecological fallacy 
issue is an important one to overcome, since EP voters will need to be aware that they are aware 
of what transpires within the EU and in particular the EP. Conversely, if survey data say that 
Europeans pay no attention to what occurs in Brussels or Strasbourg and that they do not know 
what goes on in EU, then eurosceptic public grandstanding would not be able to have any EP 
electoral effect. Even if macro-level findings suggest otherwise, there will always be concerns 
that the relationship is a spurious one if no corroborating micro-level data can be found. 
 While the general public can be routinely misled about the factual events within the EU 
and EP (Tilley and Hobolt 2011; Hobolt and Tilley 2014), public grandstanding within the EP 
provides clear evidence of whether a eurosceptic party is engaged. Moreover, since eurosceptic 
voters would prefer a weakening of the EU, they would not be likely to punish a eurosceptic 
party for being bellicose in its EP speeches or obnoxious when addressing high-ranking EU 
officials. There are ecological issues, however, that arise when explaining the link between EP 
legislative behavior and EP voters. While I cannot directly test the link between EP voters and 
parties’ EP legislative behavior, I can demonstrate a very large amount of circumstantial 
evidence that supports the media’s role as the central link between voters and parties. I do this by 
establishing the direct link between parties’ EP legislative behavior and the amount of media 
coverage they receive, and by also establishing the direct link between media outlets and the 
amount of media consumption by individuals. In doing so, I address the inherent ecological 
fallacy issues that are products of my Chapter 3 findings.  
 This chapter is organized as follows.  First, the ecological fallacy issue is discussed in 
more detail, and why it is important to provide empirical evidence that voters consider 
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themselves to be informed about EU and EP issues. Moreover, additional corroborating evidence 
that actively engaged eurosceptic parties believe that public grandstanding is an effective method 
to convey to voters their opposition to the EU is addressed. Second, the link between parties and 
the media, and the media and voters is presented. Eurosceptic parties are able to maximize their 
campaigning utility by making their EP speeches readily available for voters to watch, via both 
social and traditional media coverage of  recent episodes of public grandstanding.  
 Third, I outline the importance of being legislatively engaged for parties within the EP. 
Additionally, I explain why I would predict hard eurosceptics to behave differently from 
mainstream parties, and I diagram how my theory places the media as the central link between 
parties and voters. I also introduce my hypotheses in this section. In the fourth section, I give a 
detailed explanation of my data and how they were collected.  
 I present my findings in the fifth section of this chapter. I argue that outspoken 
eurosceptic parties are rational and strategic in their behavior even if they do, at times, let their 
emotions take control of their legislative behavior. This is strategic because higher levels of EP 
legislative engagement leads to higher levels of media coverage. Higher levels in media 
coverage, in turn, provides for more media consumption by individuals. There is a clear electoral 
advantage to behaving is such a way, and based upon how some eurosceptics market and 
publicize themselves on social media accounts, they are making conscious efforts to portray to 
voters that they are a legislatively engaged party worth supporting in EP elections. 
 Lastly, I make some closing statements regarding both this chapter and how it concludes 
my overall argument in conjunction with chapters two and three. This chapter provides an 
explanation for the middle ground between parties and MEPs in the EP and the voters in their 
respective EU member states. Via media exposure, eurosceptic parties are enabled to signal 
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directly to their supporters that they are a party that will make good on their campaign promises 
rather than to abstain from EP legislative participation. This low-cost, high-reward practice can 
help to explain why eurosceptic parties have become more electorally powerful than ever before 
within the EP. 
 
The Ecological Fallacy Issue 
 
Ecological fallacy issues arise when inferences about micro-level behavior or motives are 
inferred from macro-level evidence. This gap between the macro and micro levels can lead to 
invalid conclusions that are not supported by empirical evidence. Research on elections, parties, 
and voters are confronted with this issue because they incorporate electoral results with 
inherently micro-level voting implications that may not be borne out by survey data. In other 
words, statistically significant findings can be had when aggregating all voters into variables 
such as electoral results or economic indicators, but when asked directly if certain issues played a 
role in deciding for whom to vote, individuals may give answers that do not corroborate the 
macro-level findings.  
 This is the case when attempting to present an explanation for eurosceptic parties’ over or 
underperformance in EP elections. Voting is naturally a micro-level activity, but when 
aggregated these votes lead to macro-level political phenomena such as an electoral difference 
between over performing and underperforming eurosceptic parties in EP elections that should 
result in similar outcomes for all eurosceptic parties. I posit that an explanation for this 
occurrence can be traced to how legislatively engaged a eurosceptic party is within the EP, and 
this information is transmitted via media outlets to voters who, in turn, reward eurosceptic parties 
who participate and punish those parties that abstain.  
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 Researchers on economic voting have had to address ecological fallacy issues repeatedly 
over the years. Traditionally, economic voting research has used incumbent vote share as its 
dependent variable and economic indicators as the causal variables (see Kramer 1983; Eulau and 
Lewis-Beck 1984; Stubager et al 2014). The argument is then supported using micro-level 
survey data in which voters indicate that their perception of the economic performance of their 
country has had an effect on whether to support the current regime or to throw their support 
behind the opposition. In a similar fashion, I adapt the economic voting approach to my research 
on eurosceptic parties’ over or underperformance in order to explain the middle ground in 
between macro-level electoral findings and micro-level evidence that supports the notion that 
voters perceive themselves as aware of what takes place at the EU-level. 
 There are two advantages to turning to economic voting as a research blueprint. First, it is 
an established body of literature that has endured decades’ worth of criticism and critique. Rather 
than to try to reinvent the wheel, it is much more efficient to mimic an established research 
agenda that is confronted by the same ecological fallacy issues. Second, my research is very 
closely aligned with the research design often used in economic voting literature. This 
dissertation’s most important dependent variable is the change in vote share between national 
parliamentary elections and EP elections, and my independent variable of interest is legislative 
behavior. While economic voting uses economic indicators to explain a particular electoral 
outcome, I employ legislative-engagement indicators to explain a different particular electoral 
outcome. As such, economic voting literature provides an applicable approach in dealing with 
the problematic issues arising whenever macro and micro level data are used to explain a 
political phenomenon. 
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 For this chapter, I attempt to mitigate ecological fallacy concerns regarding my main 
empirical findings from chapter 3 by presenting numerous examples of MEPs believing their 
legislative behavior helps them with public exposure and by voters claiming that they pay 
attention. Furthermore, by tracking media hits following outspoken legislative activities I 
demonstrate that the media-link is the most likely avenue by which EP legislative activity is 
conveyed to the general public. While using research approaches from economic voting literature 
as a general guide to addressing this problem, I go further than simply including survey data that 
support my claims. Using a multilayered approach, albeit circumstantial, my aim is remove most 
doubts about whether the findings I have at the macro-level are undermined by findings at the 
micro-level.  
 I contend that if voters claim themselves to be informed about EU and EP issues, and the 
macro-level findings also indicate that legislatively-engaged eurosceptic parties are rewarded by 
voters while those eurosceptic parties that abstain are not, then the ecological fallacy issue has 
been dealt with as best it can be. I complement this leap of faith by tracking media hits to 
demonstrate that the mechanism for voters to pay attention to EU and EP affairs exists. 
Moreover, via experimental research, there is additional support for this general argument in that 
EP voters appear to be willing to reward engaged political parties even in second-order elections 
(see Hix and Marsh 2011; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011; Hobolt and Spoon 2012). My goal is to 
provide enough circumstantial evidence that there is not likely to be any substantive issues with 
my main empirical findings that eurosceptic over or underperformance in EP elections can be 
explained by EP legislative behavior and that any ecological critique is minimized.   
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Establishing the Link between MEPs and Voters 
 
There has been much research devoted to explaining why and how voters decide whether to cast 
a vote and for whom. I rely on these findings to help make my case that there are not any 
ecological fallacy problems that would undermine my macro-level findings that EP legislative 
behavior, indeed, has an electoral effect on eurosceptic parties contesting EP elections. This 
requires that various act of voting aspects are covered that include: media and campaigning, 
voter choice changes, party messaging, and research on extreme right parties and campaigns, 
among others. 
 At the micro-level, if voters can be shown to be flexible in which party they intend to 
support given new information, and that they pay attention to information about parliamentary 
behavior, then a eurosceptic’s incentives for disseminating their parliamentary behavior in 
Brussels and Strasbourg becomes stronger. This conveyance of EP legislative behavior is new 
information that can affect a voter’s decision to support a strongly eurosceptic party, particularly 
if the voter already has some degree of euroscepticism and decides that since the EP is a second-
order election little is lost by abandoning the preferred mainstream party in preference of a niche 
eurosceptic one. For those voters who are already fully loyal to a niche eurosceptic party even in 
first-order parliamentary elections then the widespread dissemination of EP legislative behavior 
can act as a reinforcement mechanism that their support is not wasted on a niche eurosceptic 
party that will not fulfill campaign promises to fight the EU from within. 
 There is experimental evidence that voters can be swayed by new information in 
hypothetical EP elections. Hobolt and Wittrock (2011) observed that a number of factors 
influence an EP voter’s decision to cast a vote for a particular party in EP elections. Using a 
spatial model framework and an experimental research design, they were able to test several 
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related hypotheses concerning what aspects affect an individual’s decision to support one party 
over others. While dissatisfaction with the national governing party played a key role for voters 
to support oppositional parties, they found strong support for informational treatments that 
informed the voter of parties’ positions concerning EU enlargement. This treatment had an effect 
by informing the voter more precisely of where a party is located ideologically, which they 
would then compare to their own policy preferences. It is entirely intuitive that the more voters 
know about party ideology and policy preferences the more likely they are to switch their loyalty 
to another party that more closely represents their own policy preferences. Were this not to be 
the case, eurosceptic niche parties such as UKIP or Danish People’s Party would find the task of 
drawing voters away from center-right mainstream parties much more difficult. Furthermore, 
media and social media exposure of anti-EU legislative behavior allows smaller niche parties to 
spread their message and further inform eurosceptic voters that there is a viable alternative to 
mainstream parties that are only slightly eurosceptic. 
 That niche parties can appeal directly to EP voters has not been lost on the parties 
themselves. Moreover, this is particularly the case with when the public in many EU member 
states are becoming increasingly Eurosceptic and when they are seeking out whom to blame for 
financial meltdowns and other crises. Hobolt and Tilley (2014) find that the EU public is 
increasingly ready to blame the EU for negative developments in their home country. In essence, 
the EU has become a whipping boy for European crises whether it has played a hand in their 
creation or not. A likely consequence of national governing parties seeking to shift blame away 
from themselves is that EU citizens are now more comfortable than ever to blame the EU for 
their problems. This, in turn, results in higher levels of euroscepticism. Naturally, this 
phenomenon of blaming the EU both when it does, and when it does not, play a hand in a 
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European crisis aids eurosceptic niche parties that are all too willing cast the EU as a straw man. 
Political opportunism suggests that niche parties can successfully campaign and craft their 
messages to seize on this situation of increasing hostility towards the EU. 
 In other research on campaigning and political communication in EP elections, it has 
become clear that parties are seeking a more prominent online presence (see Rodriguez and 
Madariaga 2016). Anecdotally, the drive to run up online hits also appears to be a motivating 
factor in EP legislative behavior and speech as was alluded to in the quote that begins this 
chapter. Clearly, Nigel Farage was aware that the more combative an EP speech becomes, the 
higher the number of Youtube or Facebook views that speech will receive. He goes further by 
directly accusing Guy Verhofstadt, prominent member of the staunchly pro-EU Liberal group, of 
heckling him solely for the purposes of increasing the Belgian MEP’s online views. 
Undoubtedly, both Farage and Verhofstadt were acting deliberately in a fashion that would lead 
to a more combative and vitriolic Youtube video that they could then broadcast to their 
supporters as evidence of their efforts in the EP to further their political goals and ideology.  
 Beyond EP elections, research into political messaging has been investigated by 
numerous scholars (see Vavreck 2009; Bullock 2011). Focusing on US presidential elections, 
Vavreck (2009) finds that even in the light of economic determinants of the vote, political 
communication and messaging also play a central role. While Vavreck was looking at US 
elections in which there are essentially only two parties competing, her thesis can be applied to 
multiparty PR elections. Furthermore, and particularly in the 21
st
 century, social media 
messaging has become a very efficient way of campaigning and solidifying a party or politician’s 
loyal following. By engaging in over-the-top EP legislative behavior, eurosceptic MEPs can seek 
to capture higher levels of media exposure simply via their political messaging. In fact, the more 
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hyperbolic the message, the better chance they have of producing low-cost information 
conveyance to their potential supporters as well as their party loyalists. 
 Data on Europeans’ media exposure demonstrate that public grandstanding is in a 
eurosceptic party’s best electoral interests. Europeans self-identify as rabid media consumers, 
both traditional (newspapers, television) and social (online newsources). According to 
Eurobarometer data, Europeans not only consume media, but they feel that the information they 
receive informs them about EU affairs. Should an EP voter already be partisan, which would 
likely be the case with most voters, then media exposure resulting directly from recent EP 
legislative grandstanding would be a quick and efficient way for a niche party to reach a broader 
audience while solidifying its base supporters. 
 Investigating why the polling during the run-up to the 2015 British General Election 
missed the mark, Melon and Prosser (2016) note that UKIP voter support dropped by just over 1 
percentage point from those who stated their intentions to vote for a UKIP candidate and those 
who actually did vote for a UKIP candidate. While their research project was focused on 
weighting issues with online polling in the UK, they add to the evidence that hard eurosceptic 
voters can be a fickle bunch when it comes to casting actual votes. Arguably, the optimal way of 
addressing a voting bloc that is prone to abstention is regularly to remind them of the importance 
of casting a vote in EP elections. By increasing the number of social media hits or UKIP 
mentions in British media outlets can serve to motivate eurosceptic voters by reinforcing the 
perception that UKIP and its MEPs are actively promoting eurosceptic ideas within the EP. 
 Further research into the emergence of the extreme right is covered in Norris’ Radical 
Right (2005). Using data from the European Social Survey and the Comparative Study of 
Electoral Systems, she is able to test New Social Cleavages hypotheses. New Social Cleavages 
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(see Anderson and Bjorklund 1991; Betz 1994; Ignazi 2003) refers to the notion that particularly 
the center-left mainstream parties left many manual and semi-skilled laborers, as well as petit-
bourgeoisie, feeling left abandoned during periods of deindustrialization. As such, this group of 
previously loyal Labour or Socialist party members began to reevaluate their political support in 
the face of economic downturn with concurrent waves of immigration. From a demand-side 
understanding of party emergence, a new social cleavage based on animosity to immigration and 
hostility towards deindustrialization provided the necessary voter numbers to allow extreme right 
parties to emerge electorally. Norris finds supporting evidence that certain socio-economic 
characteristics have a statistically significant effect on one’s support for an extreme right party; 
in particular if one is either an unskilled or semi-skilled worker (Norris 2005, 138). It should 
come as no surprise, then, that eurosceptic parties would seek to capitalize on this newly-
marginalized voting bloc. Moreover, this is a voting bloc that is used to following radio, print, 
and television media due to their previous union affiliations, type of industry
16
, and typically 
deep roots in the local community. If a eurosceptic party is able to achieve higher levels of media 
coverage due to its engaged EP legislative behavior, they will be in a prime position to mobilize 
this new social cleavage. 
 Research focused largely on the French FN, which includes micro-level interview and 
survey data, helps to further understand why eurosceptic MEPs and their parties can benefit 
electorally by engaging in outspoken EP legislative behavior. Stockemer (2014) found that FN 
activists come from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds, vary in levels of activist 
experience, but are united in certain far-right ideologies. Furthermore, Stockemer (2015) finds 
that FN popular support has only be augmented by the change in leadership that replaced Jean-
                                                          
16
 Shopkeepers interact with the local population on a daily basis, and therefore routine conversations will lead to 
a higher level of awareness and perceived injustices faced by the former center-left voting bloc. 
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Marie Le Pen with Marine Le Pen, who has ushered in a more media-savvy approach to politics 
and campaigning. Lastly, using European Social Survey Stockemer (2016) finds that it is the 
perception of high levels of immigration rather than the actual levels of immigration that drive 
much of the electoral support for extreme right-wing parties in Europe. Additional research has 
also found that perception is a stronger indicator of voter motivation than actual levels of socio-
economic or demographical phenomena (see Hetherington 1996; Hester and Gibson 2003; Evans 
and Andersen 2006; Tilley et al 2008). If perception does trump reality, then an optimal way to 
affect the public’s perception of the EU is to create direct sound bites, video, and media hits of 
eurosceptic MEPs bashing the EU from within the EP. By appealing directly to EP voters, a 
eurosceptic party can reinforce party loyalty and excitement. It does not matter that even with all 
the eurosceptic EP party groups combined there still is not nearly enough EP votes to pass any 
eurosceptic legislation. What matters is the popular perception that parties such as UKIP, the 
French FN, and others are able to create that leads eurosceptic EP voters to believe that more is 
being accomplished legislatively than is actually the case. 
 While there continues to be growth in the literature dealing with euroscepticism and 
global populism, this is a political phenomenon that is still disproportionately under-researched 
when compared to other subfields in the discipline. Particularly with the recent growth of right-
wing populism and euroscepticism within the EU, this is a political development that shows no 
signs of slowing down in the foreseeable future. 
 
 
The Importance of Strategic EP Legislative Engagement, The Media, and The Voters 
 
Recalling back to Chapter 3, the question this dissertation seeks to answer is why some 
eurosceptic parties over perform in EP elections while others do not. The first step was to 
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demonstrate that underperforming eurosceptic parties actually existed in the first place. This was 
covered in Chapter 3, but to refresh what was established previously Not-Attached eurosceptic 
parties have generally underperformed in EP elections relative to their electoral performances in 
the previous national parliamentary elections as measured by vote share. Conversely, those 
eurosceptic parties that joined an EP party group such as Freedom and Democracy generally over 
performed in EP elections. These contrasting electoral results require explanation because the 
literature would predict that eurosceptic niche parties would typically over perform in EP 
elections, and the existence of multiple parties of this type that are underperforming run counter 
to what the literature would predict. So, what explains the difference between the over 
performing and underperforming eurosceptic parties? 
 The most obvious difference between these two groups of eurosceptic parties is that 
while the over performers tend to be engaged legislatively in the EP, the underperformers 
generally are not. While this difference in EP legislative behavior can be observed on both ends 
of the electoral-legislative process, I have not yet fully explained and tested the mechanism that 
connects the electoral results and the amount of EP legislative engagement. At this point, I have 
sold the sausage and had it produced in the butchers, but I have not yet accounted for what goes 
into making the sausage; a rather vital part of the total equation. Chapter 4 seeks to accomplish 
this by demonstrating that via traditional and social media exposure eurosceptic parties and 
MEPs are able to connect to the euroscpetic voting bloc in their country. 
 I previously touched upon the myriad research that have demonstrated why EP legislative 
behavior could be used to strengthen a eurosceptic party’s standing with its base core of 
supporters. Voters claim to be informed and open to information about what transpires in 
politics. That being the case, I posit that when eurosceptic MEPs engage in anti-EU rhetoric from 
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the EP’s floor that it lends itself to widespread dissemination via social and traditional media 
outlets. This is how an outspoken MEP can essentially speak directly to EP voters. The issue 
then becomes how to measure EP legislative behavior and the subsequent link via the media to 
reach EP voters. The first step in solving this is to establish that individuals consume such a 
massive amount of media that it can be easily inferred that they will learn of political events 
occurring at the EU and EP level. 
I rely on survey data that indicate whether EU citizens perceive themselves as being 
aware of what occurs within the EU and the EP. On a positive note, there exist numerous ways of 
capturing how people become informed. First, one can look at media consumption. The higher 
the level of media consumption, the higher a person likely perceives himself to be informed. 
Second, using Eurobarometer survey data I can observe directly how much of the EU population 
perceive themselves to be informed. Third, the number of times a Youtube video has been 
watched, or the number of likes a Facebook party page receives, is easily obtained. While these 
particular numbers do not indicate the geographic location of the viewer, and thus his or her 
eligibility to vote for that particular eurosceptic party, it does provide a general idea of how wide 
the breadth a particular party has in disseminating its own information directly to EP voters. The 
more informed a population perceives itself to be, the higher the number of hits a Youtube video 
has, and the higher the number of likes a party’s Facebook page receives the better the chance 
that a eurosceptic party has of using its EP legislative behavior as a campaigning tool to reinforce 
party support amongst its loyalists. Thus, the more support there is that it is in a eurosceptic 
party’s best interest to be fully engaged within the EP because what occurs in Brussels or 
Strasbourg can easily reach the very voters a eurosceptic party seeks to attract come EP election 
time.   
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H4.1:  The public consumes sufficient levels of media outlets to be 
informed of political developments and issues related to the EU.  
H4.2:  Parties will prominently display their EP legislative behavior on 
Facebook and Youtube. 
H4.3:  Parties on the extreme left and right will have a disproportionate 
amount, relative to seat share, of social media presence as compared to 
mainstream parties. 
In Chapter 3, I adopted a rather straight-forward operationalization of EP legislative engagement. 
By calculating how many EP questions a party’s MEPs submitted and combining that with how 
often a party’s MEPs were present during EP plenary session, I introduced an index score for 
each party in the EP. I call this index score an LE Score (Legislative Engagement Score). The 
next step, however, is to operationalize how to measure media exposure a party receives. I do 
this is in two ways: Social Media (Youtube, Facebook, and Twitter), and Traditional Media 
(Newspapers and Television). These media hits are how I suggest that a party’s media exposure, 
and the population’s media consumption, can be measured.  
 When a eurosceptic party is more engaged in EP legislative behavior I predict that the 
media will pay more attention, which will directly lead to eurosceptic EP voters being reminded 
that it is worth their time and effort to cast an EP vote for an engaged eurosceptic party in their 
country if one exists. Conversely, if a eurosceptic party largely abstains from EP legislative 
engagement the media will not cover it as often as they would if the party were to be actively 
engaging the EP. This, in turn, has an effect on the eurosceptic voting bloc in that party’s country 
by not reminding them that it is important to support their preferred party in EP elections. 
I propose that total amounts of media hits is the best available option for measuring 
media consumption. Without access to Youtube or Facebook analytics, it is impossible to isolate 
media hits that occur only from within EU member states. Furthermore, geographically locating 
87 
 
eurosceptic party media hits solely from the EU member state in which it competes is not 
feasible.
17
 Still, the raw number of times a eurosceptic party’s video of an impassioned anti-EU 
speech on the floor of the EP will indicate a general level of how widespread the dissemination 
of its EP legislative behavior is being viewed. By focusing on the data from the EP party group 
level, I am able to identify patterns of media exposure resulting from EP legislative behavior. As 
such, here is the first group of hypotheses:  
 
H 4.4:  Total amount of all EP questions posed is positively correlated with 
media hits at the EP party group level. 
H4.5:  Eurosceptic parties, as well as far left parties, will receive a 
disproportionate amount of media coverage and exposure. 
 
Diagram 4.1 illustrates the predicted relationship between EP legislative engagement, media 
coverage, and EP voter support. This is also a visualization of how all five hypotheses are 
interconnected. Note that the entire relationship is also predicted to be self-reinforcing, in that the 
more a eurosceptic party is engaged the better they do electorally, which then creates momentum 
to continue to partake in EP activities and to continue to receive media attention for doing so. 
This, then, leads to higher levels of eurosceptic voter mobilization, and over time these anti-EU 
voters become used to casting votes in EP elections. 
 
                                                          
17
 The process is quite complicated for obtaining data from Facebook or Youtube. In some cases, third parties offer 
some data services, but the pricing tends to be quite expensive and there are criticisms of the validity of the data. 
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Diagram 4.1: Model of EP Engagement and Electoral Success 
 
 
The notion that this process is self-reinforcing is because as parties and MEPs notice that they 
are receiving more social or traditional media hits when they attack the EU and/or the EP directly 
via questions, they will intuitively seek to continue to engage in such behavior. Over time, they 
will also notice that they do better electorally as a result of their increased levels of media 
exposure, which will reinforce the notion that they remain engaged within the EP, and that their 
party loyalists and core constituents will construct a pattern of casting votes in EP elections, 
which it is to be remembered are elections to the parliament of a polity that they do not generally 
think should exist in the first place. 
 
Data and Methods 
 
For the first group of hypotheses, I focus on the link between the media and individuals. In order 
for this relationship to function, there must be widespread dissemination of information from the 
media to the voters, but there must also be a population that consumes what the media are 
EP Engagement 
Media Exposure 
Individuals/EP Votes 
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producing. Furthermore, EP voters will also need to be sufficiently informed about the EU, its 
processes, and recent developments emanating from Brussels, Strasbourg, and even Luxembourg 
City. In other words, if nobody is paying attention, then it does not matter how much information 
is flowing from social and traditional media outlets covering what has been transpiring within the 
EU and EP.  
In previous chapters, I argued that EP party groups can be used to identify typologies of 
eurosceptic parties (see Kreppel 2002; Hix et al 2003; McElroy and Benoit 2007). Moreover, 
with different types of eurosceptic parties came different electoral expectations that I attribute to 
parties within an EP group’s general willingness to engage in EP legislative debate. This is an 
established way of grouping parties because they willingly choose to join or not join an EP party 
group.  Furthermore, I assume that like-minded eurosceptics will choose to join together with 
other like-minded eurosceptics. I continue this approach with the second group of hypotheses.  
Both groups of hypotheses complement each other. Because research into this type of 
research question involves a certain degree of circumstantial evidence, I try to be as thorough as 
possible in focusing on each particular aspect. When taken as a whole, these two groups of 
hypotheses ought to encapsulate the general relationship between parties’ EP legislative 
behavior, the media, and voters by isolating each individual relationship partner. 
I use data from a variety of sources. Because there does not exist an established dataset 
covering all the variables that are required for testing the various hypotheses, I create my own 
dataset by combining existing data with new data observations I collected myself. As such, I will 
be as thorough as possible in explaining where the data originate, what they are measuring, how 
they were collected, and how I use them in testing this chapter’s hypotheses. 
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 Data on social media hits come from Facebook and Youtube. For these data, which I 
operationalized to capture social media exposure, I use several different counts. For Facebook, I 
use the total number of likes the party’s official Facebook page had on February 4
th
 or 5
th
, 2017. 
These data are useful in providing a general notion of how widespread a party’s social media 
exposure is. A better measurement would have been to track the number likes at various periods 
of time, but these data are not publicly available. Likewise, I collected several counts of social 
media exposure via Youtube. I collected data on the number of videos a party had on its official 
Youtube site, the number of Youtube site subscribers, the total number of times a video had been 
viewed on the official Youtube site, and the number of days each party has had an official 
Youtube site. The one exception to this is UKIP, which has an official site, but also has an 
unofficial Youtube site that is much more active than the party’s official one. In this particular 
instance, I combined the totals of both Youtube sites into one grand total. These data are used to 
test all five hypotheses. 
 In addition to the Facebook and Youtube data, I also run a LexisNexis search in order to 
observe how many traditional media hits parties have received during the 7
th
 EP session. I 
operationalize traditional media as newspapers and magazines/journals, and these are defined 
according to LexisNexis. I ran searches in the following languages: Dutch, English, French,  
German, Portuguese, and Spanish. All searches were in the national language of the party in 
question, for Belgian parties I ran searches in Dutch for Flemish parties and in French for 
Walloon parties. Furthermore, I searched by how parties are typically referred to in print media. 
For example, instead of searching for Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, I searched 
for CDU; likewise, instead of searching for Union pour un mouvement populaire, I searched for 
UMP. Due to issues arising when searching for Green parties, I dropped all Green parties from 
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my LexisNexis searches.
18
 The dates I used for the search parameters were from 14 June 2009 to 
25 May 2014; or one week after the 2009 EP election until one week before the 2014 EP election 
which I subjectively chose to do in hopes that I would not pick up too many references simply 
referring to the EP elections. These data are used primarily to test Hypothesis 4.4.  
Data calculating the total amount of EP questions, both orally and in written form, 
originate from two sources: the official EU website’s portal on each MEP and from the 
Votewatch (2016) dataset. I obtained EP question data by counting each MEP’s total number of 
questions, which is available on the EU’s official website: Europa.eu (2016). This was fairly 
straightforward in that there is an online portal where each MEP’s information is available. Then 
I simply recorded the question totals per EP session for each MEP who served during that EP 
session. These data are used to test Hypothesis 4.4. 
 Micro-level survey data come from two sources: The Eurobarometer (2014) and 
interviews of French FN party members (Stockemer 2014). For Eurobarometer data, I use the 
Eurobarometer report of Media Use in the European Union (2014). These data were collected 
during November 2014, and released as an Autumn report. Data are from all 28 EU member 
states, and includes questions that include: Watch TV on a television set, Watch TV online, Use 
the internet, Listen to the radio, read traditional media, and Use social networks. Most 
importantly, Eurobarometer data are broken down into demographic groups including age, 
employment sector, educational attainment, gender, and social class. In addition, EU member 
state breakdowns are also available. Also included is a question concerning the trust one has in 
the media, which I believe helps to illustrate why eurosceptic voters may flock to social media 
sources for their political information. This would reinforce why it is important for this type of 
                                                          
18
 A major issue that arose when searching for Green parties is that “green” also picked up the color adjective 
term. Moreover, because none of the Green parties are ever referred to in print by their official party names, 
conducting a LexisNexis search on this type of party become overly problematic. 
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party to make the most of their EP legislative opportunities in order to bolster their online media 
presence. These data are used to test Hypothesis 4.1. 
 For Stockemer’s data (2014), which is a much more qualitative type of survey data, 
actual interview dialogue is available. These interviews were conducted between January and 
June 2013, and Stockemer interviewed 44 FN members. Of particular interest here, genuine 
perspectives of FN members are expressed individually, so that their own views on culture, the 
media, or other issues are directly available. In the course of these interviews, trust in the media 
are highlighted, and these observations become complementary to the Eurobarometer data taken 
from across the EU. These data are used to test Hypothesis 4.1. 
 The goal of this chapter is to seek to overcome the inherent ecological issues that arise 
when a research project takes electoral data (EP electoral over or under performance), and to 
explain this phenomenon by tracing EP legislative behavior to EP voters via the media. In other 
words, going from a macro-level analysis to a micro-level analysis while trying to keep constant 
the overall quantitative methodology of the project. As such, this chapter’s methodology is a 
mixture of a basic correlation matrix and descriptive data. The goal is to compile a sufficiently 
high level of circumstantial evidence that EU citizens follow, and pay attention to, various media 
outlets at a high enough level that it can be assumed that if a political party is able to receive 
widespread media exposure that they will be reaching their targeted demographic. 
 
 
Findings 
 
Europeans consume a massive amount of media. Social media outlets have dramatically 
increased media exposure, and these media outlets have more than compensated for any decline 
in traditional media consumption. In fact, official party Youtube videos have been viewed just 
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under 200 million times as of February 2017. In this section, I provide the data that I collected in 
order to demonstrate that the EU public is consuming media, both social and traditional, in very 
high amounts. While these data are still circumstantial in nature for overcoming the ecological 
fallacy issue that is inherent in this dissertation, I believe that their overwhelming levels of 
calculable consumption will satisfy criticism that the link between EP legislative behavior and 
EP voters has been well addressed. Moreover, survey data will show that micro-level data exist 
that also support this notion. First, however, it is incumbent to show just how saturated the media 
market is within the EU. 
 
Social Media 
 I illustrate much of my findings at the EP party group level. Even though the data are 
collected at the party-level, the findings are more easily understood by grouping the various 
parties by their EP group. Moreover, my central argument for this dissertation is that niche 
eurosceptic parties are fundamentally different from their mainstream counterparts, and one of 
the ways to demonstrate this is by using EP party groups as a means to group together 
likeminded parties. In Figure 4.1, I show the mean number of Youtube video hits by party, which 
is then illustrated by EP party group. Since each EP party group is readily identifiable by its 
general political ideology, this will provide a sense for how ideology interacts with social media 
consumption. 
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Figure 4.1: Mean Number of Youtube Views by EP Group Party 
              
 
          
Clearly, eurosceptic parties enjoy a much higher social media consumption than do mainstream and left-
leaning EP party groups. For Not-Attached parties, the mean number of times an official party Youtube 
video was viewed is over 7 million times. Freedom and Democracy parties’ Youtube videos have been 
viewed nearly 4 million times on average, and the soft eurosceptic EP party group Europe of Nations, or 
previously the Conservative and Reformers, had their mean number of Youtube views nearly 5 million 
time. As a reminder, these figures reflect the mean number of times Youtube videos were viewed on a 
party’s official Youtube channel, so these are indicative of how many times the typical party within each 
EP party group’s Youtube videos were viewed. At a per-capita level, the right wing EP group parties 
dominate social media consumption, which reinforces the expected benefits of this type of party being 
able to use the media to reach EP voters. Furthermore, in the case, eurosceptic parties are able to reach 
directly their party loyalists via social media. These findings strongly support Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.5.  
 While Figure 4.1 shows the mean number of times Youtube videos were viewed, Figure 2 shows 
the mean number of subscribers the official party Youtube channel had as of February 2017. These two 
figures are used to support Hypothesis 4.1. While mean number of Youtube video views gives a glimpse 
at how often the typical party within an EP party group has had one of its videos watched, the mean 
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number of official party Youtube channel subscribers will tell how many party loyalists are likely to be 
strongly linked to a party’s social media platform. While these data are not specific enough to isolate only 
EP voters in a particular party’s country, I assume that the numbers are generally indicative of their 
loyalist base since these are Youtube Channels in the party’s native language showing videos that are also 
typically in the party’s native language. Therefore, I believe that only a small fraction of the numbers are 
attributable to those who are not eligible to vote for the party to which they are Youtube subscribing. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Mean Number of Youtube Subscribers by EP Group Party 
 
 
Again, the average number of Youtube subscribers is much higher for parties in the three 
eurosceptic EP party groups. These parties are managing to dwarf much larger, mainstream 
parties in terms of their online presence, which is another indication that eurosceptic parties 
enjoy a direct link to their voters via which they can disseminate information. This way of 
directly linking their party to its loyalists is observably noted by these eurosceptic parties who 
have taken full advantage of their party’s Youtube channel to reach out to voters. Youtube media 
consumers, I would argue, represent active party loyalists because unlike Facebook, these 
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subscribers are typically only using Youtube for viewing videos. These findings support 
Hypothesis 4.1. 
 Facebook, however, is another social media platform that parties can exploit to reach 
their potential voters and party loyalists. In Figure 4.3, I show the mean number of Facebook 
likes the official party’s Facebook page has as of February 2017. Just as is the case for Youtube 
social media presence, the eurosceptic EP party groups dominate in terms of Facebook social 
media exposure.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Mean Number of Facebook Likes by EP Group Party 
 
 
Because Facebook likes typically get shared and publicized to Facebook users’ friends, this 
measurement is a particularly useful one in capturing the level of social media consumers’ 
support for a specific party. Youtube videos can be viewed anonymously, but liking a party’s 
official Facebook page is a public pronouncement of a Facebook user’s party loyalty. This also 
demonstrates that there is a clear and direct path that eurosceptic parties can use to relay their 
messages, and other information, to EP voters without passing through any type of traditional 
media filter. This also highlights the opportunities that many Not-Attached EP party group 
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members fail to take advantage of by abstaining from active EP legislative debate. These hard 
eurosceptic parties have the online audience already in place, but many of them are failing to use 
this to their advantage. Nonetheless, there is clear evidence that millions of Europeans are 
actively engaging their parties online. These findings support Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.3.  
 Comparing Youtube video views to Facebook likes is not a perfect comparison. Youtube 
video views can happen multiple times by the same social media consumer. For example, for a 
particularly anti-EU individual, he can watch Youtube videos of his eurosceptic party ranting 
about the injustices of an omnipotent EU dozens of times. He can only Facebook like his 
eurosceptic party one time. In effect, what I am capturing with these two measurements is an 
individual’s social media consumption intensity on the one hand, and the individual’s party 
loyalty on the other. In Figure 4.4, I illustrate the difference in volume of these two 
measurements. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Total Social Media Hits for all Parties in EP 
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As is clearly noted in the figure above, social media truly plays into an individual’s intensity to 
consume a party’s information and messages. While Facebook likes provide us with a more 
accurate measurement of the number of individuals consuming social media and their 
demonstrated party loyalty, Youtube views shows us how social media is being consumed 
repeatedly by individuals. A party supporter can only like a Facebook page once, but a party 
loyalist can watch Youtube videos a number times. In other words, individuals are consuming 
massive amounts of social media concerning parties, and this realm is dominated by eurosceptic 
parties. Eurosceptic voters, or at least potential voters, are paying attention to their party’s social 
media outlets; which helps to build the case that the relationship between EP legislative behavior 
and EP voters is becoming clearer when the perspective is changed and the relationship is 
viewed from the bottom up. These are further findings that strongly support Hypothesis 4.1. 
 On the party side of the social media consumption relationship, it is obvious that many 
parties have realized the potential benefits of directing their own media presence. In Figure 4.5, I 
show the mean number of official party Youtube videos broken down by EP party group. While 
the differences between the various ideological groups is less stark than on the consumer side, 
eurosceptic parties are still among the most active in posting their official Youtube videos online. 
Only the Alliance of Socialists EP party group competes with hard eurosceptic parties in terms of 
mean number of official Youtube videos. 
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Figure 4.5: Mean Number of Youtube Videos by EP Group 
 
 
What Figure 4.5 is able to capture is essentially how serious the various ideologies of parties take 
their social media exposure. These data help to establish support for Hypotheses 4.2 and 4.3. In 
order for party loyalists to view regularly a party’s Youtube video, the party must do its part to 
post regularly new videos that it feels will reinforce its members loyalty and enthusiasm; as well 
as potentially attract new party voters. On the other hand, if a party abstains from its obligation 
to provide its members with direct social media content it is signaling that it is not taking itself as 
seriously as it should. This is particularly true for parties on the far right, which have an inherent 
advantage over other types of parties in that their party loyalists consume, on average, far more 
political social media than do the loyalists of other non-far right parties. Lastly, Figure 4.5 
illustrates that many parties believe that there is an electoral benefit to having a strong online 
presence. While this belief may be unfounded, the accumulation of circumstantial evidence is 
building up to a point where logically it would be surprising if social media exposure is not 
reaching the general population in Europe. If most parties believe it is worth their time to post 
official party Youtube videos, and these videos are being viewed hundreds of millions of times, 
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the case is becoming quite strong that the optimal way to advertise what a party is doing within 
the EP is to use media to reach potential EP voters. These findings support Hypotheses 4.2 and 
4.3. 
 
Traditional Media 
 For traditional media exposure, I break down my findings into two categories: 
Newspapers and Magazines/Journals. I choose these two categories because these are the most 
readily visible forms of traditional print media. Of course, there are party press releases, 
pamphlets, or posters that can advertise a party’s behavior or ideology, but these print media are 
more difficult to track accurately and are likely to be much more constrained in who is able to 
view them. Therefore, I track the two most widespread and easily obtained forms of traditional 
print media 
Figure 6 shows that while eurosceptic parties still generally receive the highest mean 
number of hits, the difference between eurosceptics and non-eurosceptics is not as large as it is 
for social media outlets. Still, eurosceptic parties are receiving, in general, more newspaper 
attention than are other types of parties. Another aspect worth noting here is that these are mean 
number of newspaper hits in EU member states as large as Germany and as small as Belgium, so 
the overall number of newspapers a large country has is mitigated by the relatively smaller 
number of newspapers in smaller countries like Belgium. 
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Figure 4.6: Mean Number of Newspaper Articles by EP Group Party 
 
 
What is interesting in Figure 4.6 is that newspaper hits follow the general EP legislative behavior 
exhibited by the member-parties of the respective EP party groups. The Not-Attached parties 
engage within the EP far less often than do their niche party eurosceptic counterparts in the 
Freedom and Democracy. While social media sources do not follow this pattern, newspaper 
outlets do. Regardless, there still remains ample evidence that newspapers are still actively 
reporting on political news and information at a very high frequency. These finding support 
Hypotheses 4.3 and 4.5. 
 The second traditional print media source that I track is magazines and journals. 
Magazines and journals operate far less frequently than do newspapers, so it is expected that 
their nominal number of media hits will be far less than is the case with, for the most part, daily 
newspapers. In Figure 4.7, I show the mean number of magazine and journal hits parties within 
the various EP party groups received during the 2009-2014 EP session. 
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Figure 4.7: Mean Number of Other Print Media Articles by EP Group Party 
 
 
In contrast to Figure 4.6, which tracked newspaper hits, the Not Attached EP party group 
received the lion’s share of mean number of magazine and journal hits in Figure 4.7. Moreover, 
and in stark contrast to all of the previous social and traditional media outlets, the eurosceptic EP 
groups did not dominate in media presence; save for the Not Attached eurosceptic EP group. 
Still, when taken in their totality, magazines and journals were responsible for thousands of 
articles on political parties. These print media sources complement other media sources in 
reaching potential EP voters, and when taken in conjunction with other social and traditional 
media sources, the total number of media products that are consumed reaches well into the 
hundreds of millions. These findings provide additional support for Hypotheses 4.3 and 4.5. 
 What is clear in tracking media hits concerning parties is that social media now 
dominates traditional media in terms of how parties can direct information and messages to party 
loyalists and potential EP voters alike. In Figure 4.8, I illustrate just how much more frequent 
social media hit occur than do traditional media hits. Of course, social media would be predicted 
to have a higher hit frequency than traditional print media sources, since we can track Youtube 
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video views, but there is no way of tracking whether a print media article is read multiple times 
outside of online views of print media articles of which the data are not readily available. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that for eurosceptic niche parties an online presence is clearly the 
optimal route for reaching their supporters. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Descriptive Statistics for all Parties in EP 
 
 
By counting the number of times a party’s official Facebook page is liked, or the number of 
times a party’s official Youtube video is streamed, can help to establish whether the media can 
be playing the critical role of disseminating what occurs within the EP. The sheer volume of 
media consumption can be accepted as a sufficient amount of circumstantial evidence that the 
hypotheses I proposed in Chapter 3 are supported throughout the relationship between EP 
legislative engagement and electoral outcomes, particularly for niche eurosceptic parties. What is 
made clear by the data in this chapter is that unengaged Not Attached parties are perhaps even 
more foolish not to become engaged within the EP given their social media exposure than what 
was previously thought. If a Not Attached party is choosing not to partake in EP legislative 
behavior, then they are wasting their natural advantage in disseminating their message to their 
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supporters and using that momentum to mobilize them to vote in EP elections. These findings 
strongly support Hypothesis 4.1. 
 Lastly, in Table 4.1, I show a correlation matrix between amount of EP Questions and the 
various social and traditional media exposure. There is correlation between the amount of EP 
questions and the amount of social and traditional media coverage. Furthermore, with strong 
correlation between the various types of social media outlets, it would indicate that once 
someone has started consuming one type of social media outlet they readily consume other social 
media outlets. In other words, if an individual engaged with a party on Facebook, he is more 
likely than not to engage with a party’s other online presence such as Youtube. 
 
 EP Questions Newspaper 
Hits 
Facebook Likes Youtube 
Subscribers 
Youtube Video 
Views 
EP Questions 1.00     
Newspaper 
Hits 
.4888 1.00    
Facebook Likes .5702 .5002 1.00   
Youtube 
Subscribers 
.4308 .3806 .8009 1.00  
Youtube Video 
Views 
.3003 .2642 .6219 .8849 1.00 
Table 4.1: Correlation Matrix for EP Engagement and Media Exposure 
 
Table 4.1 helps to establish the link between EP legislative behavior and media coverage. This is 
the first half of the general relationship between EP legislative behavior, the media, and EP 
voters. While the previous figures can demonstrate that the second half of the relationship is 
likely occurring due to the overwhelming numbers of hits the various types of social and 
traditional media outlets are receiving, this correlation matrix is able to provide support for the 
notion that the media will pay attention to what transpires at the EP level. Moreover, because the 
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parties themselves can control their social media outlets, they can, in effect, control the entire 
relationship between themselves and their voters. This correlation finding provides support for 
Hpothesis 4.4. 
 
 
Survey Data 
 
Descriptively, there are ample amounts of circumstantial evidence that individuals are 
consuming media coverage of political news and information, and that most parties themselves 
believe that it is worthwhile to have a robust social media presence. There is more evidence, 
however, that the media, both social and traditional, create the link between parties’ EP 
legislative behavior and EP voters. Eurobarometer survey data also support the notion that 
Europeans are incredibly connected to media consumption, and Stockemer’s (2014) FN survey 
data can provide glimpses for why it is that hard eurosceptic parties are able to have such a large 
online media presence. 
 In Figure 4.9, Eurobarometer (2014) survey data is shown that indicates how often EU 
citizens consume the various types of social and traditional media. The dark blue represents 
those who answered every day/almost every day with regards to each media outlet. 
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 Source: Reproduced from Eurobarometer 82, page 5 (2014)   Figure 4.9 
           
 
As is confirmed by the Eurobarometer survey data, it is likely that almost every respondent has 
daily consumption of some type of media outlet. In this regard, it is highly unlikely that an 
eligible voter in EP elections could be entirely isolated from information about parties. Even if 
the sole account of recent EP legislative behavior is a sound clip advertising for that day’s 
evening news, notions of what parties are doing while in Brussels or Strasbourg will be 
disseminating from the EP level down to EP voters via media outlets. Previously, the raw 
number of social and traditional media hits were given to demonstrate the enormity of media 
consumption, but these Eurobarometer findings are able to further support the notion that people 
are paying attention by providing evidence that people perceive themselves as being strongly 
connected to various media outlets. These findings provide micro-level support for Hypothesis 
4.1. 
 Lastly, when French FN supporters were interviewed by Stockemer (2014), their 
responses corroborated all the previous notions about the media. There is one additional aspect, 
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though, that corresponds directly to why hard eurosceptic parties enjoy such social media 
dominance over other parties that are much larger in terms of popular support and party 
organization. The far right has a very strong distrust of traditional media outlets. Throughout his 
interviews, FN loyalists repeatedly talked about their lack of trust in traditional media. There was 
a common theme that traditional media were inherently biased against the FN, and that this bias 
was leading to false reporting and attributing negative aspects to the FN. In such a situation, it is 
intuitive that such FN loyalists would begin searching for political information from alternative 
media sources. Since the internet easily provides such alternatives to traditional media, a 
eurosceptic party’s online presence can replace television or print media for those with extreme 
distrust of traditional media outlets. Stockemer’s findings further corroborate previous support 
for Hypothesis 4.1. 
All five hypotheses are largely supported. Those parties that routinely engage the EP 
legislative process by posing questions receive more frequent media coverage. This is 
particularly the case for eurosceptic parties, which receives a disproportionate amount of media 
coverage both online and in print. On the other hand, far left niche parties, which I predicted 
would receive a similarly disproportionate amount of media coverage as do eurosceptics was not 
supported by the data. Following these findings, one is confident in saying that being active 
within the EP will likely lead to higher levels of media coverage. Thus the first half of the EP 
legislative behavior, media, and voters relationship is supported by the data. 
 For the second half of the EP legislative behavior, media, and voters relationship, 
hypotheses H4.3 and H4.5 are partially supported. The public consumes an enormous amount of 
media. Upwards of 90% (Eurobarometer 2014) of Europeans watch television daily and a 
majority are routine users of social and print media. Should a political occurrence transpire in 
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Brussels or Strasbourg the vast majority of the European public will likely be aware of it. Not 
only are individuals highly engaged with the media, but parties are also aware of the benefits of 
have a strong online presence. While far left niche parties do not perform as well as eurosceptic 
niche parties in this realm, it is clear that parties recognize the value of having media exposure 
online via Facebook and Youtube. H4.1 tests whether the public pays attention, but H4.3 tests 
how engaged the non-mainstream public is with far right and far left niche parties. Both are  
generally supported, and thus the second half of the EP legislative behavior, media, and voters 
relationship is strongly supported, as well.  
 Table 4.2 provides a quick summary of the hypotheses and whether they were supported 
by the data. 
 
Hypothesis Predicted 
Outcome 
Actual 
Outcome 
Explanation 
H4.1 The public consumes sufficient 
amounts of media to conclude that 
they are informed. 
+ Supported Media consumption is recorded 
in the hundreds of millions of 
articles, videos, and Facebook 
engagement. 
H4.2 Parties will have a strong online 
presence 
+ Supported Parties do have a strong online 
presence. 
H4.3 Eurosceptics and far left parties 
having a disproportionately large 
social media presence. 
+ Partially 
Supported 
True for eurosceptic niche 
parties, but not supported for far 
left niche parties. 
H4.4 EP questions positively correlated 
with media hits. 
+ Supported There is a correlation between 
amount of EP questions and 
media coverage 
H4.5 Extremist niche parties will 
receive disproportionate amount of 
media coverage. 
+ Partially 
Supported 
True for eurosceptic niche 
parties, but not supported for far 
left niche parties 
Table 4.2: Hypothesis Results 
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Conclusion 
 
In closing, this chapter’s primary goal is to establish the link between parties’ EP legislative 
behavior and the public. Chapter 3 demonstrated statistical support for the notion that EP 
legislative engagement had an electoral effect on a party’s vote share in EP elections. But, those 
findings only addressed the two ends of the EP legislative behavior, media, and voters 
relationship. While this evidence is important in identifying underperforming eurosceptic parties 
and proposing an explanation, it is necessary to document how media outlets act as the conduit 
between what is happening in Brussels or Strasbourg and how the public will gain this 
information. If the data show that the public pays attention to what is happening politically and 
that it is fully consuming both social and traditional media, then explaining the in-between 
becomes much easier. I proposed that the media operate as the in-between mechanism, and the 
evidence I collected for this chapter largely supports this notion. 
 All five hypotheses are either supported or partially supported. I tested the link in both 
directions of the media’s relationship with parties at the EP level and with the public. On both 
accounts there are large amounts of circumstantial evidence that support the notion that the 
media rewards actively engaged parties, and that the public consumes such a high level of both 
social and traditional media that it is beyond a reasonable doubt that EP voters will be informed 
about political phenomena emanating from the EU and EP. This dissertation’s most important 
findings are in Chapter 3, but this chapter provides complementary support for those previous 
findings that there are two types of eurosceptic niche parties: those that over perform and those 
that underperform. The literature suggests that niche parties receive an electoral boost in EP 
elections, and I identified a number of eurosceptic niche parties that do not. But, for my 
explanation to hold water it is incumbent that the media play the in-between role in informing the 
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public of what is transpiring. The data included in this chapter achieve that goal and fill in the 
last blanks of the EP legislative behavior, media, and voter relationship. 
 From the party’s perspective, traditional media is free and social media is extremely low-
cost. The only real costs a party incurs for its social media presence is paying the staff that post 
Youtube videos and oversee Facebook pages. Yet, the public relations outreach of social media 
is very high. This low-cost high-rewards scenario promotes the continued expansion of official 
party outlets on social media, and lends logical support that both social and traditional media act 
as the conduit between parties and voters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
111 
 
Chapter V 
Conclusion 
 
Engaged eurosceptic parties generally over perform in European Parliamentary (EP) elections 
relative to their vote share in national parliamentary elections. Non-engaged eurosceptic parties 
generally underperform in EP elections relative to their voteshare in national parliamentary 
elections, and the clearest difference between these two types of eurosceptics is that the over 
performers are more engaged in EP legislative behavior. The underperformers largely abstain 
from becoming involved in EP plenary session debate. Those that engage do better in EP 
elections than those that do not. The full situation explaining hard eurosceptic parties EP 
electoral performances, however, is more complex than simply showing up to the EP and 
actively participating. There are other components that play a critical role for this phenomenon to 
occur. 
 As was noted earlier in this dissertation, EP elections are considered to be second-order 
elections. Voter turnout is generally lower in EP elections than in national parliamentary 
elections, and niche and opposition parties routinely outperform mainstream governing parties. 
Because hard eurosceptic parties are rarely in governing coalitions and are typically niche parties 
with little ideology beyond immigration and their opposition to the European Union (EU), both 
types of eurosceptics would be predicted to do well in EP elections. Because the non-engaged 
eurosceptic parties do not generally do well in EP elections, this requires an explanation. I 
propose that this occurs because unengaged eurosceptic parties do not create the material that 
media outlets can easily disseminate to the voting public. In posing EP questions and taking to 
the floor of the EP to deliver an anti-EU speech creates easily packaged products that the media 
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will subsequently publicize. If a eurosceptic party does not engage the EP legislative process, 
then these materials are not created. The media, in turn, then do not have any EP activities to 
cover and broadcast. This leads to less media coverage, and the public is not as well informed 
about what the eurosceptic party is doing in its elected capacity. This leads to less voter 
enthusiasm to vote in EP elections, which is troublesome for eurosceptic parties because they 
must mobilize a voting demographic that does not believe that the EU ought to exist in the first 
place. For eurosceptic voters, having a constant reminder via media outlets that their party is 
fighting the EU day in and day out will help to drive this type of voter to the EP polls. Crucial, 
however, is that the eurosceptic party create the materials and products from within the EP for 
the media outlets to carry on to the voting public. If these materials are not produced in the first 
instance, then the rest of the process will play out differently from those hard eurosceptic parties 
that do produce memorable EP speeches and large amounts of EP questions. 
 After explaining my theory in detail in Chapter 2, I tested hypotheses that addressed EP 
electoral outcome and EP group, which I used as a heuristic for grouping together like-minded 
parties that shared similar EP legislative behavior. First, however, it was necessary that I 
demonstrate that underperforming hard eurosceptic parties exist. In Table 3.1 in Chapter 3, I 
showed that for Not-Attached parties the mean underperformance in EP elections was almost 1 
percentage point. Or, in other words, Not-Attached parties’ vote shares in EP elections are on 
average 1 percentage point less than what they achieve in their national parliamentary elections. 
While that may not seem like a large difference, when contrasted with Freedom and Democracy 
parties that gain an average of almost 3.5 percentage points in EP elections, it becomes clear that 
there are several eurosceptic niche parties that are over performing in EP elections. 
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Descriptively, there was evidence that this type of underperforming hard eurosceptic party 
existed.   
Next, I tested EP electoral over or underperformance by using a model that incorporated 
EP group as the causal variable on a dependent variable of change in vote share between EP 
election and the previous national parliamentary election. The findings showed that in all three 
models Not-Attached parties had statistically significant underperformance finding for EP 
elections. While Not-Attached parties were submitting high levels of written EP questions, they 
attended EP plenary sessions at very low rates and posed few if any oral EP questions, which 
allowed for the engaged eurosceptic parties in Freedom and Democracy to establish much higher 
Legislative Exposure (LE) scores. Non-engaged eurosceptic parties were not engaged within the 
EP, and these parties routinely contradicted what the literature would predict. Engaged 
eurosceptic parties were engaged within the EP, and these parties conformed to what the 
literature would predict, which is that they would over perform in EP elections. Chapter 3 is able 
to explain the two ends of the EP Legislative Behavior-the Media-the Voters relationship that 
was illustrated in Diagram 4.1 of Chapter 4. 
While the two ends of the relationship were examined in Chapter 3, the process of 
informational dissemination was established in Chapter 4. The challenge to this type of research 
question is that macro-level findings that state that an electoral phenomenon is occurring are rife 
with ecological fallacy issues. When taken in isolation, EP legislative behavior’s effect on EP 
over or underperformance tells us that something is happening, but it cannot tell us how it is 
happening. I suggest that it is via media outlets that EP engagement is able to be transmitted 
from the party to the voter. Chapter 4’s evidence is in support of this notion. First, I established 
the link between the media, both social and traditional, and the public. I did this by compiling as 
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much circumstantial evidence as possible that the public consumes such a large amount of media 
that the link is bound to be there. Moreover, Eurobarometer and Stockemer’s (2014) evidence 
support the circumstantial evidence that the public consumes sufficient amounts of media to be 
informed. Second, by correlating party participation via posing questions in the EP and media 
hits I show that the link between parties and the media is well supported. Using Lexus-Nexus 
media search findings, there is a decently strong correlation between how many times parties 
pose EP questions and the amount of media hits they receive in return. When both of these links 
are taken in conjunction with one another, the full diagram of the process comes into picture. 
Higher levels of EP legislative engagement leads to higher levels of media exposure, and the 
public consumes such a large amount of social and traditional media that come EP election time 
those engaged eurosceptic parties will over perform while the non-engaged eurosceptic parties 
will generally manage to do worse in EP elections than they did in their previous national 
parliamentary elections. 
 The process of being actively engaged within the EP, receiving more media attention, and 
eurosceptic voters rewarding an engaged eurosceptic party in EP elections is more than a 
onetime occurrence. Engaged eurosceptics have taken notice of this self-reinforcing relationship. 
In doing so, they prime their party loyalists to become routine EP voters. UKIP epitomizes this 
type of successful eurosceptic. Rather than to abstain from EP legislative participation, UKIP 
became a regular hard eurosceptic participant. This led UKIP supporters to become more 
enthusiastic to vote in EP elections, and thus the natural contradiction of voting in an election 
that they do not believe ought to exist in the first place is overcome.  
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2019 EP Elections 
 
The next EP elections will be held during the summer of 2019. Several events have already taken 
place since the 2014 EP elections, and it appears that hard eurosceptic parties are beginning to 
take notice of the importance of becoming engaged within the EP. The first step that formerly 
non-engaged eurosceptics are taking as they transform into engaged eurosceptics is to decide to 
join an EP group. If past EP electoral performances by engaged eurosceptic parties is any 
indication, these newly engaged eurosceptic parties will be predicted to over perform in 2019. 
 The hard eurosceptic party that epitomizes this newly engaged eurosceptic is the French 
FN. Marine Le Pen has done many things in transforming the FN into a less extreme, more 
mainstream party both within France and the EP. She has softened the FN’s stance on many 
social issues, and notably has refrained from the types of anti-Semitic remarks that characterized 
her father’s reign as head of the FN. Most importantly from this dissertation’s perspective, 
however, is that after the 2014 EP elections she quickly moved forward and established an EP 
group, the Europe of Nations and Freedom EP group. Recalling Chapter 3’s findings, this 
political evolution would suggest that this is the first step in the process of becoming engaged at 
the EP, which the media will reward with increased levels of coverage, and which will lead to 
more routine reinforcement of party supporters to cast votes in an EP election. 
 The French FN is not the only formerly Not-Attached party that has decided join the 
Europe of Nations and Freedom EP group. In Table1, I show the hard eurosceptic parties that 
previously were Not-Attached, but have since chosen to join an EP group.  
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Party Joined an EP Group 2019 Predicted 
Over/Underperformance 
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (AT) 
Vlaams Belang (BE) 
Front National (FR) 
Lega Nord (IT) 
Partij voor de Vrijheid (NL) 
Nations and Freedom 
Nations and Freedom 
Nations and Freedom 
Nations and Freedom 
Nations and Freedom 
Over Performance 
Over Performance 
Over Performance 
Over Performance 
Over Performance 
Party Remained Not-Attached 2019 Predicted 
Over/Underperformance 
Jobbik (HU) Not-Attached Under Performance  
      Table 5.1: Changes since 2014 EP Election 
 
As is noted in Table 5.11, only the Jobbik party has chosen to remain Not-Attached during the 8
th
 
EP session. Anecdotally, it appears that a handful of formerly non-engaged eurosceptics have 
changed course and decided that they would become engaged during the 2014-2019 EP session.  
Several formerly Not-Attached parties failed to win any EP seats during the 2014 elections, so 
these parties are not included in the table. The British National Party, The Greater Romania 
Party, and The Attack Party (Bulgaria) failed to win even a single EP seat in 2014. This is 
consistent with my theory on engaged and non-engaged eurosceptics. It just happened that for 
these three parties their non-engaged EP legislative behavior eventually cost them their last EP 
seat, and they now only exist as former Not-Attached parties.  
 
Future Research Directions 
 There are several new research projects that can be taken from this dissertation.  First, for the 
engaged eurosceptic, political communication is key to achieving electoral success. Moreover, 
social media have become the optimal conduit for eurosceptic parties to communicated directly 
with party loyalists as well as potential new party supporters. In this line of thinking, a fertile 
area of future research is to complement the existing literature on party communications. More 
specifically, the communication employed by eurosceptic parties. Fortunately, there is a growing 
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literature that focuses on the social media presence by political parties, and the social media 
consumption habits by voters. 
 Over the past decade, scholars have begun to take social media seriously as form of 
political communication (see Gibson and Ward 2000; Lupia and Philpot 2005; Druckman et al 
2009; Gulati and Williams 2013; Rodriguez and Madariaga 2016). Of particular interest to 
scholars of extremism and populism is the role that social media can assume for parties on the 
ideological fringes. Hard euroscepticism requires emotional arguments against a more globalized 
society in which local and national customs and traditions are being eroded in favor of a new 
cosmopolitanism that explicitly rejects national identity. Facebook and Youtube are perfectly 
suited for conveying eurosceptic parties’ counterarguments against the EU and globalization. As 
such, further research into the particular methods and approaches that eurosceptic parties in 
Europe, and extremist parties worldwide, adopt in order to mobilize their supporters is both 
timely and relevant. 
 An additional direction for future research on eurosceptic parties will be to observe how 
well many of the formerly Not-Attached parties do in the 2019 EP elections. If the handful of 
newly engaged eurosceptic parties listed in Table 1 start to receive the electoral bump that the 
other engaged eurosceptic parties have had, then further examination of that transformation from 
unengaged eurosceptic to engaged eurosceptic will be warranted. Did these euroscpectic parties 
learn from more successful ones such as UKIP or the Danish People’s Party? Or was it a more 
random transformation in that the FN and FPO simply found the numbers required to form an EP 
group, but they behave just as they had before? This opens new lines of research into eurosceptic 
party elites, legislative and electoral learning, and the case of eurosceptic parties existing in a 
state of limbo until a charismatic and entrepreneurial leader emerges. Because euroscepticism, 
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and global populism widely defined, appears to show no signs of slowing, these new research 
directions can complement the existing literature. 
 
Closing Remarks 
 
This dissertation began when I noticed that several eurosceptic niche parties were not behaving 
as the literature predicted they would. Instead of over performing in EP elections, these parties 
were doing worse in EP elections than they were doing in national parliamentary elections. Since 
these parties were both niche and in the opposition nationally, not only should they not have 
been underperforming, they ought to have had a double electoral benefit in EP elections. Yet, 
they were still generally underperforming in EP elections. Further investigation showed that 
these underperforming eurosceptics disproportionately belonged to the Not-Attached EP group. 
Freedom and Democracy EP group parties were over performing in EP elections, so the first step 
in explaining this phenomenon of underperforming eurosceptic parties was to focus on what 
differentiated these two groups of eurosceptic niche parties. 
 Quickly it became clear that the Not-Attached parties were not as engaged within the EP 
as were parties of the Freedom and Democracy group. This led to questioning how and why EP 
legislative engagement was having a statistically significant electoral effect during EP elections. 
The logical answer to this was that the media were assuming an intermediary role between 
parties and their EP legislative behavior and voters. The next step was to see if whether a link 
could be established between EP legislative behavior and the amount of media coverage parties 
receive. Concomitantly, there also needed to be evidence to support the link between media 
outlets and the public. In both cases, large amounts of evidence supported the notion that what 
parties do at the EP level is picked up by media outlets. Furthermore, the public consumed such a 
large amount of social and traditional media that it would be illogical for the public not to be 
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informed of what is transpiring in Brussels and Strasbourg. In addition, eurosceptic parties took 
control of their own media outlets via Facebook and Youtube to disseminate their own videos 
directly to the public. While this messaging is admittedly biased in favor of the eurosceptic party 
that produced it, it still served as information that conveyed to the eurosceptic parties’ loyalists 
that they were worth casting a vote for in EP elections. 
 The parties that capitalized on this relationship were rewarded with electoral over 
performances in EP elections. Those parties that failed to capitalize on this relationship were 
generally punished. Whether or not a hard eurosceptic party realized their electoral advantages in 
EP elections is what made them either an engaged eurosceptic or a non-engaged eurosceptic. 
Engaged eurosceptics take advantage of the low-cost high-reward afforded to them by social and 
traditional media and EP elections. The non-engaged eurosceptic does not take advantage of 
these benefits, and as a result tends to do poorly in EP elections. When taken to the extreme, this 
type of non-engaged eurosceptic party will eventually be electorally punished to the point where 
it will not be able to win any EP seat, as has been the case of the British National Party, The 
Greater Romania Party, and the Bulgarian Attack Party. 
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Appendix 
Determinants of  
∆ Vote Share 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Not Attached -5.00*** 
(1.7) 
-4.58** 
(2.04) 
-3.79** 
(1.61) 
Freedom/Democracy .98   
 
Conservatives/Reform  
(1.95) 
-.38 
 
 
 
 
Nordic Greens 
(1.62) 
3.16** 
(1.43) 
 
 
 
Group Greens 
 
Liberal Dems 
     3.53*** 
    (1.13) 
   -2.07** 
 
 
   -3.15*** 
 
 
Social Dems 
 
Christian Dems 
 
Controls 
 
(.86) (1.22) 
-3.16**** 
(.89) 
-.05 
(1.22) 
 
Unemployment -.05 
(.09) 
-.06 
(.09) 
-.02 
(.09) 
Opposition Status 
 
7.90**** 
(.81) 
8.00**** 
(.80) 
8.62**** 
(.78) 
Minor Coalition Partner 
 
Left-Right Ideology Scale 
 
constant  
7.04**** 
(.95) 
.83**** 
(.21) 
    -10.95**** 
6.99**** 
(.94) 
.24 
(.23) 
-6.22**** 
6.95**** 
(.95) 
.35** 
(.15) 
-8.80**** 
 
 
N 
      (1.43) 
    
       414 
(1.41) 
 
        414 
(1.27) 
 
       414 
Adjusted R2 .25 .26 .22 
P>F .0000 .0000 .0000 
 *(p<0.10), **(p<0.05), ***(p<0.01),****(p<0.001)  
     Appendix Table 1:  Pooled Cross Sectional Model  
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Acronym Full Name Acronym Full Name 
BNP 
EP 
EU 
FN 
FPO 
LE score 
British National Party 
European Parliament 
European Union 
French National Front Party 
Freedom Party of Austria 
Legislative Exposure Score 
 
MEP 
Tories 
UK 
UKIP 
US 
Member of European Parliament 
British Conservative Party 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom Independence Party 
United States 
         Appendix Table 2: Acronyms 
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